The persistence of non-identity : spiritual experience in Adorno by Restagno, Michael
Université de Montréal
The Persistence of Non-Identity:
Spiritual Experience in Adorno
par Michael Restagno
Philosophie
Faculté des arts et des sciences
Mémoire présenté 




© Michael Restagno, 2019
2
Abstract
Adorno’s  conception  of  spiritual  experience  gains  its  critical  import  from  its
predominantly negative character: experience is no longer understood as a vehicle for what
is  communicated  to  us  directly,  but  instead as  the  expression of  an objective lack  that
blocks  the  possibility  of  direct  communication  altogether.  This  lack  is  expressed
epistemically  by  the  subject-object  split  in  Idealism,  and  socially  by  the  process  of
“disenchantment”  that  is  intrinsic  to  modernity.  The  aim  of  reconstructing  Adorno’s
conception  of  spiritual  experience  is  to  show  how  this  social  lack  can  be  adequately
communicated  within  an  epistemic  context  that  blocks  the  possibility  of  direct
communication; conversely,  it  is  only once this  problem is  surmounted that the critical
import of spiritual experience can be established. We will reconstruct Adorno’s conception
of spiritual experience on the basis of its relation to what is given, or what we assume is
communicated directly to us in experience. As the given gains its problematic character in
relation to idealistic accounts of experience, we will depart with the failure of subjective
idealism to properly account for the given object in experience. Following this, we will
show how the positive aspects of spiritual experience are established through the sustained
critique of reified accounts of experience such as positivism and phenomenology. As both
accounts  aim  to  smooth-over  the  subject-object  split  by  grounding  experience  in  a
particular  form  of  givenness,  we  will  show  how  their  respective  failures  in  reducing
experience to givenness express the possibility of an un-reduced account of the former. The
final  section  of  the  work  will  attempt  to  establish  Adorno’s  conception  of  spiritual
experience  as  a  positive  response  to  these  failures:  in  other  words,  it  attempts  to  get
something right about experience on the basis of how the latter is wrongly construed. More
precisely, the concept’s adequacy as a response is demonstrated through its ability to make
connections between the epistemic insufficiencies of reductionistic accounts of experience
and the social processes which underpin the phenomenon of disenchantment.




Chez  Adorno,  l’expérience  spirituelle  devient  un  concept  critique  grâce  à  son
caractère négatif; ce dernier n’est plus compris comme une voie par laquelle l’expérience
immédiate est possible, mais plutôt en tant qu’expression d’une carence objective, bloquant
la possibilité de fonder l’expérience sur l’immédiat. Le séparation entre sujet et objet devient
l’expression épistémologique de cette carence, le processus de ‘désenchantement du monde’
son expression sociale. En reconstruisant la conception d’expérience spirituelle, il devient
possible montrer dans quelle mesure cette carence sociale peut s’exprimer directement, tout
dans un contexte épistémologique qui bloque la possibilité de communication directe; du
coup,  c’est  seulement  en répondant  à  ce problème que l’expérience  gagne son caractère
critique.  Notre  reconstruction  se  sert  du  concept  de  ‘donné’ (ou,  l’objet  de  l’expérience
immédiate) comme fil conducteur. Comme le concept de donné devient problématique dans
le  cas  de  l’idéalisme subjectif,  nous partirons  de  l’échec  que  subit  l’idéalisme dans  son
inclusion du donné dans son schéma transcendantal. Après nous établirons les aspects positifs
de  cette  conception  de  l’expérience,  qui  deviennent  intelligibles  lors  de  sa  critique  du
positivisme  et  la  phénoménologie.  Ces  deux  disciplines  recouvrent  le  problème  du
désenchantement en fondant la possibilité de l’expérience sur une conception particulière du
donné; c’est donc dans l’impossibilité d’une réduction de l’expérience au donné qu’il est
possible de cerner comment l’expérience non-réduite pourrait se présenter.  Dans la section
finale, le concept d’expérience spirituelle est présenté dans sa positivité, en tant que réponse
aux échecs du positivisme et la phénoménologie: autrement dit, le concept peut proprement
exprimer  l’expérience  dans  la  mesure  qu’il  comprend  comment  l’expérience  peut  être
faussée.  En  tant  que  réponse  aux  échecs  des  conceptions  réducteurs  de  l’expérience,  la
qualité du concept d’Adorno est démontrée à travers sa capacité d’établir des connections
entre  la  carence  épistémique  de  ces  conceptions  réducteurs  et  les  processus  sociaux
constituant le phénomène de désenchantement du monde.
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Introduction:             
The Problematic Character of Spiritual Experience
Theodor Adorno’s philosophical work culminates in a theory of spiritual experience
(geistige  Erfahrung).  From  his  inaugural  lecture  in  19311,  Adorno  has  advanced  this
conception of experience through sustained criticism of its contemporary accounts: in the
inaugural lecture alone, Adorno’s tentative presentation of his project is intertwined with a
string of refutations that range from logical positivism to fundamental ontology. Adorno
was dissatisfied with the majority of these accounts insofar as they committed a common
error by grounding the possibility of knowledge either on what is given within experience,
or on what  is  given prior to  experience:  for example,  neo-Kantianism and fundamental
ontology were concerned with the grounding of  experience in  a priori concepts,  while
opposing accounts such as positivism would limit experience to what is given empirically.
In this sense, givenness is associated with indubitability, whether this has to do with what is
true to consciousness or the truth that is independent of the latter. Adorno argues that either
forms of givenness are false: what is given conceptually is the result of cognitive activity
which produces concepts within experience,  and what is  given empirically can only be
understood in relation to the subject who produces these concepts. As a result, the idea of
immediate givenness seems to be a product of false consciousness, in the trivial sense of
mistaking something mediated by human activity for something that is irreducible to that
very activity – ie, nature.
But if we are to hold that the given is always mediated by some form of subjective
activity, we then might slip into the type of subjective idealism that Adorno himself rejected
in his critiques of Kant and Hegel. Adorno avoids this problem by arguing against the idea
that subjectivity structures the  totality of experience: what we experience is not perfectly
reducible  to  the  subjective  concepts  whose  ‘givenness’  seems  to  (falsely)  precede
1 Theodor W. Adorno, “The Actuality of Philosophy”, Telos 31 (1977).
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experience. While the upshot is that the object of experience is now understood to possess a
non-conceptual  character,  the  problem  persists:  how  can  we  actually  understand  non-
conceptuality  in  its  positivity  when  Adorno’s  epistemic  strictures  hold  that  we  cannot
equate it with the seemingly mind-independent character of what is given empirically?
The concept of the given seems to possess a demonstrably contradictory character.
Brian O’Connor lays this out by noting the concept’s 3 different characteristics:
[Adorno’s] claims are: (1) that idealism is essentially correct about the cognitive composition 
of our world (so even ‘the given’ must bear the determinations of consciousness); (2) that in  
experience there is an epistemically significant relation to something non-conceptual; (3) that  
the very notion of the given is ideological in character in that it fails to consider the social  
construction of  ‘what there  is’,  a  construction that  Adorno rejects  for  the  reasons that  are  
familiar to the critical theory perspective. On the face of it  these are claims that do not fit  
easily together: (1) and (2) are mutually exclusive, and (3) appears to render (2) naïve.2
Givenness  can  possess  these  seemingly  contradictory  characteristics  because  Adorno’s
conception  of  experience  is  structured  temporally:  it  is  on  the  basis  of  these  very
contradictions  that  the  concept  transforms itself  through  experience,  from  our  initial
encounter to its eventual dissolution. Briefly sketched, the departing moment of spiritual
experience is found in the antinomy between the intuitive concepts (1) that we immediately
pin  to  objects  of  direct  experience  and the  objects  themselves  (2),  which  have  a  non-
conceptual character. Finally, what we assumed to be given is dissolved in the unfolding of
this antinomy (3), as the object’s immediate character is now understood to be the result of
inadequate  conceptualization;  the object  of  experience  is  subsequently transformed into
something more determinate  through our experience of this inadequate conceptualization,
revealing the necessity of its subjective-mediation in experience, as well as the social origin
of the inadequacy. Adorno’s conception of spiritual experience must be understood as a
process; it gains its specificity through the temporal character that it brings to seemingly
immutable philosophical concepts. This character is the clue to why the given departs from
being an intuitively immutable concept and ends up dissolving itself under the weight of its
2 Brian O’Connor, “Adorno and the Problem of Givenness”, Revue Internationale de Philosophie 58, 
vol. 227 (2004); 1.
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own contradictions. As we cannot presume that the given is inherently “false” –  this would
ignore  its  non-conceptuality,  –  we  must  instead  reconstruct  the  process of  spiritual
experience in order to map the concept’s transformation. 
The first chapter will frame the problematic nature of subjective idealism. It departs
with a basic explanation of the “motor” that allows for the transformation of given objects
or concepts in experience, subsequently giving the latter its temporal character: determinate
negation  (bestimmte  Negation).  Afterwards,  we  will  establish  Adorno’s  critique  of
subjective  idealism  through  the  latter’s  inability  to  allow  for  the  full experience  of
determinate negation, namely on the basis of its commitment to subject-object identity as
the structure of experience. We will end with a tentative sketch of Adorno’s key theoretical
commitment in the establishment of his concept of experience: the priority of the object
(Vorrang des Objekts), which entails that we let the object’s non-conceptuality guide us
towards re-adjusting the concepts that we take to be intuitively given.
The  second  chapter  will  expand  this  theoretical  commitment  through  a
reconstruction of Adorno’s critiques of contemporary accounts of experience. Adorno was
an ardent critic of what he believed to be the two most advanced attempts at escaping from
subjective idealism: positivism and Husserlian phenomenology.  Positivism aims to ground
the  possibility  of  knowledge  in  the  existence  of  mind-independent  objectivity,  its
irreducibility to concepts serving as a thorn in the side of idealism; phenomenology, on the
other hand, aims to ground the possibility of knowledge on the immanent meanings that
accompany  the  objects  of  immediate  experience,  all  without  recourse  to  the  empirical
givenness of these very objects. Each account is grounded on an antinomical conception of
the given (empirical or conceptual), and both fail because in their haste to exclude the other,
they end up solely equating the object with their respective conception of givenness. As
such, neither can adequately prioritize the object in experience: in positivism there are no
conceptual givens for the non-conceptual object to brush against, and in phenomenology
there is no non-conceptual object which spurs us to re-adjust the concepts we thought to be
merely intuitive.
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In the final chapter we will use the point of convergence between the failures of
positivism and phenomenology as a springboard to the positive elaboration of Adorno’s
conception of spiritual experience. Positivism and phenomenology operate within the logic
of  a  “gap”  between  facticity  and  transcendence,  and  their  situation within  this  gap
expresses the fact that the empirical reality of society contradicts the promises held in the
conceptual categories that we use to grasp it. We will start by demonstrating how Adorno’s
conception of philosophical interpretation differs from the “methodological thinking” that
underpins  positivism  and  phenomenology:  unlike  both  disciplines,  Adorno  refuses  to
analytically separate the conceptual and empirical aspects of experience and reify them into
givens. Reifications of this sort allow for scientific methodologies to end up obfuscating the
possibilities  within  experience  because  their  respective  conceptions  of  subjectivity  and
objectivity are too abstract to properly account for the experience living individuals. This is
no accident,  as the most significant of these experiences are ones that have to do with
suffering, which exists as an expression of the antagonism between society’s promises and
its  “grim empirical  reality”.  Reductionistic  accounts  of  experience  have  a  wider  social
function:  to  provide  the  conceptual  infrastructure  for  the  “smoothing-over”  of  social
antagonisms. Adorno will require a type of procedure to think through the antagonisms of
the social totality within the particular objects that we experience, all while negating their
givenness: the concept of the constellation. After presenting the concept, we will show how
it structures the immanent critique of Husserlian phenomenology presented in the second
chapter. This will allow us to provide a full picture of how experience departs from the
given particular to the constitution of the universal, now depicted negatively in the form of
an antagonistic society. 
The wider aim of reconstructing Adorno’s conception of experience is to establish a
bridge between the epistemological and sociological character of his work, as the latter is
often misread as being ‘hostile’ to the idea of individual experience which serves as the
object of epistemological inquiry. In his concern with the problem of the given, Adorno
equips critical theory with a socially-oriented conception of experience, which is one that
eschews appeals to intuition and immediacy in favor of a sustained, polemical relation to
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the  social  entities  that  seem  to  simultaneously  exceed  our  very  control.  By  tying  the
meaning of experience to the repeated negation of what we take for granted as individuals,
our experience of the world is no longer passive: in a society rife with abstractions, one is





The Problem of Idealism
1.1 Adorno’s Hegelian Motivation: The Concept of Determinate Negation
Adorno’s  conception  of  spiritual  experience  is  primarily  indebted  to  Hegel:
experience is understood as a temporal  process that departs from the given particular and
culminates in the constitution of what is understood to be universal truth. The processual
nature of experience confers a particular quality to error: as experience is understood as a
progression, errors cannot simply halt the process of knowledge’s constitution. While in
Hegel the necessity of this particular quality ends up dissolving with the appearance of the
universal, for Adorno it is one that experience can never part with.
 In  Hegel,  negativity  is  not  merely  a  form  that  represents  a  lack  of  concrete
experiential content, for if this were the case the status of “error” would then disintegrate
the content of experience into nothingness. Put differently, error should not be accompanied
by the intuition that the truth was never there to begin with: “such a one-sided view is the
skepticism which  sees  in  the  result  [of  negation]  always  only  pure nothing and which
abstracts from the fact that this nothing is determinately the nothing of that from which it
results. However, only when taken as the nothing of that from which it is emerges is the
nothing in fact the true result; thus it is itself a determinate nothing and it has a content”.3 In
this passage, Hegel presents error as part of process, as the former is the result of something
determinate that has preceded it. The negativity of the error represents an objective lack
within  the  particular’s  process  of  actualization,  of  becoming-concrete;  conversely,  this
process  of  actualization manifests  itself  within the subjective concepts  that  mediate  the
content of experience.  The determinate character that Hegel accords to negation is meant to
convey that error is something that is experienced: it must thus have experiential content as
3 GWF Hegel, The Phenomenology of the Spirit (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press),  57.
Additions are made in order to clarify the process that ends in the ‘result’.
12
well as a living subject who mediates it. Let’s provide a rather banal example to express
how fundamental this concern is for Adorno:
Let’s say that I am experiencing two qualitatively distinct objects that also resemble
each  other  almost  perfectly  when  given  empirically:  salt  and  sugar.  I  then  happen  to
mistake the salt for the sugar and pour it into my coffee. While it is not until I actually drink
the coffee that I know which is which, the act of drinking coffee does not merely end in the
knowledge that my coffee does not contain sugar. For if it did end here, there would be
nothing  spiritual about  experience  at  all:  as  a  knowing  subject,  I  wouldn’t  be  able  to
determine anything more about my relation to the world other than the fact that my senses
can mistake something for an other. If my error prompts me to adopt a skeptical viewpoint
on the basis of the unreliability of the senses, following the latter to its logical conclusion
entails that I cannot actually know the difference between salt and sugar, namely because
my sense of taste can be just as deceptive as my sense of sight. For Hegel, this type of
negation  is  abstract  as  it  does  not  allow  experience  to  unfold into  more  determinate
knowledge  –  which  he  associates  with  the  process  of  becoming concrete: “Skepticism
which ends with the abstraction of nothingness or emptiness cannot progress any further
from this point, but must instead wait to see whether something new will present itself and
what it will be, in order that it can also toss it into the same empty abyss”.4
Yet if we take the contrary view – that spiritual experience does not merely end in
error but instead departs from it –, my relation to the world as a knowing subject opens up
to reveal aspects that  did not originally appear  within my immediate experience of the
object. In this renewed context, what my error tells me is that what is given empirically in
experience is not a proper criterion of truth, and this is because certain experiences can trick
the senses.  On the other  hand, the experience of error  necessarily  moves beyond mere
skepticism, as it is possible to differentiate between salt and sugar: for one, both substances
have been pre-arranged into their respective shakers instead of being mixed together. Yet I
also cannot rely on the assumption that this prior arrangement is correct, as this would posit
that  the  difference  between  salt  and  sugar  is  already  immediately  “present”  in  the
4 Hegel, The Phenomenology of the Spirit, 57.
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surrounding world –  despite the fact that in this particular case the difference itself must be
experienced negatively, through error.
The example above shows that I cannot simply pin the concept of sugar to what I
assume to be its corresponding object without experiencing it, as this would admit to an a
priori ‘background’ in which object and concept are already identical. On the contrary, this
is exactly what will be proven wrong: my assumption that the concept of sugar is being
pinned  to  the  contents  of  a  particular  shaker  will  be  negated  through  a  significant
experience of the object. Yet I can neither emphatically experience an object without a prior
concept for it to ‘brush’ against, for the latter serves as the standard of cognition that is to
be  modified  by  the  experience  of  error.  If  the  concepts  which  seem to  exist  prior  to
experience  are  actually  treated  as  separate from  experience,  then  experience  itself  is
meaningless:  when  isolated  from  each  other,  the  conceptual  and  empirical  aspects  of
experience become givens – what Hegel deems to be forms of “non-real consciousness”. 
While  conceptual  and  empirical  givenness  share  an  immediate  character,  their
objects come from different sources: what is indubitable to the senses originates from a
source that is independent to subjectivity, while what is indubitable to reason comes from
within the concepts that constitute subjectivity. As both forms of “non-real consciousness”
are concerned with different yet equally-significant aspects of experience, the precise way
in which each fails to do justice to reality on its own is determined by the other in the form
of an objective lack: empirical givens lack conceptuality, and conceptual givens lack a real
object to mirror and subsequently be measured against. These forms of consciousness are
non-real in the sense that they have yet to be actualized; yet because the actualization of
one form of non-real consciousness requires it to confront the other, both are negated in the
process: “The completeness of the forms of non-real consciousness will emerge through the
very necessity of their progression and their interrelations”.5 The result is the actualization
of a form of consciousness that is increasingly “attuned” to the objects of experience, as the
latter  have  now become more  determinate  through the  experience  of  error.  Once error
prompts  one  to  understand  that  the  particular  object  was  merely  appearing  for
5 Hegel, The Phenomenology of the Spirit, 56-57.
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consciousness instead of communicating to us directly what it is in itself,  the particular
consciousness experiences a new object:
We see that consciousness now has two objects: One is the first in-itself, and the second is the 
being-for-it of this in-itself. The latter seems at first to be only the reflection of consciousness 
into itself, a representing not of an object but rather only of its knowing of that first object. But 
as was previously shown, the first object is, to consciousness, thereby altered. The first object 
ceases to be the in-itself and, to consciousness, becomes that which is only the in-itself for  
consciousness.  However,  this  way  there  is  this:  the  being-for-it  of  this  in-itself,  the  true,  
which  however  means that  this  is  the essence,  or  its  object.  This  new object  contains  the  
nothingness of the first; it is what experience has learned about it.6
Yet the consciousness that now experiences this object is also altered, as the negation of the
original object also contains that of the consciousness which experienced the original object
in its immediacy, as being ‘in-itself’. The negative content contained within the new object
is the imprint of its subjective mediation, now understood as inadequate conceptualization.
Once this particular moment of subjectivity becomes objectified, it can then be knowable:
“While it therefore finds on its object’s part that its knowing does not correspond to the
object, the object itself also does not endure. That is, the standard for the examination is
altered when that for which it was supposed to be the standard itself fails the examination,
and the examination is not only an examination of knowing but also an examination of the
standard of knowing”.7 
For Hegel as for Adorno, spiritual experience is determined by a relation of co-
constitution between subject and object: the alteration of consciousness is contingent upon
the alteration of the object that is experienced through error, and the alteration of the object
is contingent upon the alteration of the consciousness that experienced it. “This dialectical
movement which consciousness practices in its own self (as well as in its knowing and in
its object), insofar as, for consciousness, the new, true object arises out of this movement, is
properly what is called experience”.8  Experience is understood as a dialectical process of
subject-object mediation, as subject and object modify eachother both ways. The dialectical




movement of experience thus leads us from the particular to the universal: the particular
individual’s  experience  of  objectivity  leads  to  an  objective  understanding  of  how
subjectivity  works  as  a  whole,  and  the  particular  objects  that  subjectivity  encounters
become increasingly “spiritualized” through their interrelation with this whole. It is up until
this stage that Adorno remains within Hegel’s idealistic framework, as he will now dissent
regarding the way in which the universal is experienced in its actuality.
The spiritual  character  of experience – the fact  that  it  moves from particular  to
universal –  is contingent upon the fact that the individual’s experience is always mediated
by society. In other words, experience of the universal is possible because experience takes
place within an actualized context of universality: society is none other than the universal
in its actuality, the realization of reason itself. While Adorno agrees with the first statement,
his experiences lead him to disagree with the second; unlike Hegel, Adorno understood the
society in which he lived as the actual  concretization of an irrational  process,  one that
prevents subjects from fully experiencing reality. 
Despite the fact that society exists, it does not exist in the same way as a standard
“object” insofar it cannot be experienced as given. In other words, while objects can be
experienced directly,  society is  experienced indirectly.  Experience  of  society is  indirect
because – while it might be concrete – it is a concrete totality: it is the mediating context in
which particular objects appear immediately as givens. Here both Adorno and Hegel are in
agreement. The mediating power of society operates through an internal logic, which for
Adorno is represented in modernity by the principle of equivalence that allows for objects
to be exchanged amongst each other: all objects are thus commensurable in exchange as
long as they each possess an exchange value. Translating the intrinsic value of objects to
exchange value comes at an experiential cost: objects are mediated by the mechanism of
exchange through the compression of their individual qualities into a quantifiable exchange
value. Yet when the object is submitted to the movement of the market, its exchange value
seems to be an intrinsic property despite the fact that it is the result of a systematic process
of social labor; the “experiential cost” is thus illegitimately recuperated. The fact that this
systematic  process  of  social  labor  is  “baked-in”  to  the  object  without  being  directly
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experienced is testament to the fact that whatever we experience as a given can only be the
result  of  something  else  that  is  much  more  significant.  So  how  can  we  experience
something that indirectly mediates what we experience directly? This is where Adorno parts
ways with Hegel: while the latter believes that we can develop a positive understanding of
society as a totality, the former argues that as rational subjects we can only experience it
negatively, namely due to the fact that its irrational character becomes the catalyst which
can spur subjectivity to shed light on the block possibilities contained within it.
While we cannot presuppose the empirical givenness of society by construing the
latter  as  an object  of  experience,  we can  neither  presuppose its  totalizing character  by
equating what makes it essential – its capacity to exceed all particulars contained within it –
with a particular set of concepts. According to Adorno, this is what Hegel eventually falls
victim to, as his commitment to subject-object identity forces him to identify the rational
structure  of  society  with  the  rational  structure  of  subjectivity:  as  subjective  knowledge
progresses towards truth about  society,  the latter  then becomes the actualized universal
through which subjectivity  is  constituted.  Yet  if  society in  its  empirical  actuality  is  not
merely given, we also cannot presuppose a concept of rationality through which we can
move beyond this empirical givenness in order to gain more determinate knowledge about
society “in itself”. If the intrinsic rationality of society and coherence of social-relations are
presupposed, they are not experienced in their actuality: and if they are not experienced in
their  actuality,  they  can  not  be  negated  in  experience.  Reason  can  never  amount  to
coinciding with reality if we assume that it already does, as there is no longer any negative
aspect of experience that prompts us to correct the standards through which we evaluate the
world around us; if subjectivity cannot re-evaluate its standards, it is because its standards
are deemed to be already correct. 
1.2 Sketching the Problem of Idealism
For Adorno, an idealistic conception of experience is one where the appearances
within the empirical foreground of experience are subordinated to the concept of essence,
the intelligibility of which exceeds the realm of appearances. As appearance is mediated by
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the senses and what we understand to be essence is mediated by subjective concepts, both
should  co-exist  within  a  relation  of  perpetual  differentiation  insofar  as  their  respective
objects originate from different sources. Yet in idealism, the subordination of appearance to
essence occurs within a relation of immediacy: what appears in experience as an individual
particular  reverts  back  immediately  to  its  conditions  of  possibility,  which  are  then
intelligible  to  reason  in  the  form  of  universals.9 But  if  objects  only  appear  within
experience, and that these universals precede appearances as their conditions of possibility,
then how can these universals become immediately intelligible to reason if they are not –
like the objects they constitute – immediately “present” in experience? Idealism solves this
problem by grounding experience within the confines of consciousness itself: as such, the
universals which mediate the existing particulars can be identified with the given concepts
which constitute the essential aspects of subjectivity. Idealism thus possesses two features
that  distinguish  it  from other  conceptions  of  experience.  The  first  feature  is  to  “found
notions such as reality or truth on an analysis of consciousness”10, while the second is a
fundamental  relation  of  identity between  the  knowing  subject  and  objective  world.  If
experience can  only be  founded on an analysis  of consciousness, it  is because idealism
posits a necessary relation of identity between consciousness and the objects that it is meant
to apprehend.
The  problematic  nature  of  this  identity-relation  can  be  expressed  in  idealism’s
relation to the ‘given’: while objects that are immediately given to consciousness through
sensation must come from a source beyond consciousness, in idealism this source is only
comprehensible  in  relation  to  the  conceptual  machinations  of  a  knowing  subject.
Conversely, if there exists a relation of non-identity between subject and object, then the
object  is  construed  as  knowable  all  while  possessing  aspects  that  have  not  yet  been
adequately conceptualized by the subject. Adorno calls this particular aspect of the object
9    While for Hegel “essence must appear”, appearance is finally identified with essence in the  
culmination of the rational process in which it appears. Subject and object become Absolute Spirit, 
and Absolute Spirit becomes immediately discernible within the subjects and objects which appeared
and perished before it.
10 Theodor W. Adorno, “Husserl and the Problem of Idealism”, The Journal of Philosophy 37, no.1 
(1940):  5.
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its  ‘non-conceptuality’,  conversely  understood  as  a  ‘surplus’ that  exceeds  the  subject’s
ability to exhaust an object by forcing the latter to into the concept that is meant to contain
it. If subject-object identity were  not presupposed by idealism, then the givenness of the
object would be the source of non-identity between itself and subject insofar as objects are
first experienced as being given from a source outside subjectivity.
1.3 Adorno’s Understanding of Subject-Object Identity
The  aim  of  idealists  such  as  Kant  and  Fichte  is  to  secure  subjectivity  as  the
condition  of  all  possible  knowledge by grounding  the  possibility  of  experience  on  the
principle  of  subject-object  identity.  Subject-object  identity  is  established  by  granting
autonomy to consciousness and its corresponding concepts in the constitution of knowable
reality: “The autonome ratio – this was the thesis of every idealistic system – was supposed
to be capable of developing the concept of reality, in fact, all of reality, from out of itself”.11
The idea of constitution entails that what we can understand as reality is only intelligible in
the  context  of  its  production by  consciousness  and  the  conceptual  categories  that  are
intrinsic to it: the object is either ‘transformed’ from undetermined, ‘raw’ material, as in
Kant; or it is posited absolutely by the subject, as in Fichte and Hegel.
Adorno’s understanding of ‘autonomous subjectivity’ is resolutely materialistic: the
concept itself stems from the realm of human activity, where the subject retains a relative
independence in regard to the object in experience, just as a craftsman is independent of
what they are producing. Like the craftsman, subjectivity is independent in relation to its
object because in experience it not only precedes the constitution of the object itself, but is
also the latter’s condition of possibility: without the “mixing” of one’s conceptual labor, the
object persists as undifferentiated material,  which cannot provide the basis for a proper
understanding of reality insofar as it lacks any conceptuality whatsoever. “Hence talk about
thought is always accompanied by talk about a material that thought knows to be distinct
from it, a material it processes the way labor processes its raw materials”.12 In other words,
11 Adorno, “The Actuality of Philosophy”, Telos, 120-121.
12 Theodor W. Adorno, Hegel: Three Studies (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), 21.
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the convergence of the rational and the real is predicated on the existence of a rational
subject  that  precedes  the  constitution  of  (what  we take  to  be)  reality  itself.  Subjective
autonomy is what permits consciousness to determine whether the real is rational or not,
and this is done by measuring the object against the concept that it represents; objects have
little say in the matter, as their very objectivity is only intelligible insofar as it is to be
apprehended by consciousness in the first place. In idealism this relation of independence
actually goes one way instead of two: despite the fact that  “talk about thought is always
accompanied by talk about a material that thought knows to be distinct from it”, the object’s
independence to subject is given a reduced role, as it serves no other purpose than being
formed through purely conceptual activity. In other words, subjective autonomy results in
the relative dependence of the object to the conceptual categories of the subject, as there is
nothing in the former that is not already reducible to the latter.  
Brian O’Connor argues that Adorno’s conception of “identity” can be distinguished
on two levels: while de-facto identity “posits the exclusive meaningfulness of concepts” in
the sense that objects only become determinate to thought through the use of concepts, “de
jure identity misconstrues the subject-object relation as one of exhaustive correspondence”,
in which “meaning is a matter of an object strictly fitting to a concept”.13 De facto identity
is a necessary condition for what O’Connor calls the “vertical dimension” of the subject-
object relation, “in which a subject has a directly physical yet significant experience of an
object”.14 In this basic relation, significant experience of a physical object is only possible
through the mediation of subjective concepts, as nothing is experienced directly without
first “passing through” our conceptual apparatus; an example of this type of mediation can
be found in Kant’s “pure concepts of the intuition”. The experiential role of sensation is
meaningful in this particular dimension, as it is the condition through which the materiality
of the object is given; before passing through the pure concepts of the intuition, the object
cannot even be constituted spatio-temporally – let alone be given any determinate qualities
–  and thus  cannot  even be  given to  sensation  in  the  first  place.  Yet  in  this  dimension
13 Brian O’Connor, Adorno’s Negative Dialectic (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), 17-18.
14 O’Connor, Adorno’s Negative Dialectic, 15-16.
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experience itself is still  relatively dependent on the object, as there must still be an object
that precedes us if we are to have “a directly physical” experience of it; on the other hand
“significant experience” of a physical object also implies that there are aspects of the object
that are meaningful to the subject, and must thus be translate-able into concepts. As such,
“there are features of the object that are in some sense both beyond subjectivity yet also
capable of providing a key requirement for the realization of subjectivity”.15 
In Kant the object retains its independence from the subject, but only in a trivial
manner16: the object is first understood as matter to be processed by consciousness, as the
“essential” character that makes it fully independent from subjectivity – the object taken ‘in
itself’–  is deemed to be beyond the subject’s epistemic limitations. While Adorno agrees
that subjectivity is necessarily limited in its capacities to understand objects, he does not
agree that these limitations should be established prior to experience: for if they are, the
independent object is always experienced as transcendent – as something that cannot be
determined conceptually. As a result,  Adorno will not only try to radicalize the Kantian
motive of according the object independence in experience, but also guarantee that object-
independence is preserved without recourse to the idea that the latter is transcendent.
 Adorno is more cautious regarding de jure identity, which occurs within the “lateral
dimension” of the subject-object relation, “in which a subject judges – applies a concept to
– an object which is itself a conceptual whole”.17 In this dimension, the fact that the object
is already subjectively mediated is prioritized over the object-independence found in the
vertical  dimension: the object is  construed  “as a conceptual  whole” because it  must be
converted into a concept in order to undergo the process of inter-conceptual mediation.  For
O’Connor, this is best represented in Hegel, who regarded the given object of immediate
experience  as  mediated  through-and-through  by  subjectivity;  conceptual  activity  –  the
dialectical mediation of the object – would thus proceed on the basis of the subjects’ critical
self-reflection  of  its  mediating  role  in  experience.  While  self-reflection  leads  to  the
absolutization of (de jure) subject-object identity in Hegel, Adorno’s commitment to non-
15 Ibid, 16-17.
16 In Adorno’s view, object-independence in Kant remains a blocked possibility.
17 O’Connor,  Adorno’s Negative Dialectic 16.
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identity aims to ensure that the non-conceptual remainder is preserved at each stage of the
subject’s conceptual activity, thus cementing non-identity as the internal logic of subject-
object mediation. Here Adorno is immanently criticizing Hegel: experience leads to more
determinate  knowledge  only  if  we  take  non-identity  to  be  one  of  its  conditions  of
possibility18.  The “lateral  dimension” of  the subject-object  relation is  crucial  to  Adorno
because it is here that the subject of spiritual experience engages in the type of conceptual
activity  that  can  possibly  exceed  the  strictures  of  constitutive  subjectivity;  namely  by
systematically  according  priority  to  the  significant  aspects  of  the  object  that  are
encountered in the vertical dimension of experience.
The introduction of the problem of non-conceptuality establishes the key difference
between both forms of identity.  De facto identity still  allows for non-identity to appear
within the subject-object relation insofar as the object’s non-conceptual features can prompt
the subject to re-adjust its concepts as a rational response. Conceptual adjustment occurs
within the lateral dimension of experience, where it also becomes possible for the subject to
merely force an object into a concept under the logic of de jure identity; this consequently
extinguishes the possibility of further re-adjustment, as the non-identity between subject
and object can no longer appear once object is reduced to subject. Here the dialectic turns
to a standstill, which is what Adorno’s critique of Hegel will center itself around:
 From the outset of Hegel’s  Logic,  the equation of Being and Nothingness on the
basis  of  absolute  indeterminacy19 first  limits  the  possibility  of  non-identity  within  the
vertical  dimension of experience,  as the object is  understood as totally  indeterminate –
meaningless to experience – in its absolute independence from the subject. While it seems
like Hegel is making the same mistake as Kant, Adorno believes that Hegel goes further in
his error: as the subject must already mediate the indeterminate object in order to make it
into something determinate, the possibility of mediation is thus predicated on the a priori
identity  of  subject  and object.  Hegel’s  conception  of  experience  culminates  in  subject-
object identity, as it is only under a relation of total dependence on the subject that: 1) the
18 In Adorno’s Negative Dialectic, O’Connor argues that Adorno is a transcendental philosopher on the 
basis of his reliance on transcendental argument in his immanent critique. 
19          Theodor W. Adorno, Lectures on Negative Dialectics (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2008), 184.
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object becomes absolutely determinate through subjective activity; and 2) that objectivity
becomes  the  totality  that  mediates  the  sum  of  these  determinations.  Conceptual
readjustment in Hegel might proceed on the basis of negativity, or non-identity between
subject and object, but the negation itself is negated in the appearance of the new object. As
a result,  the new object of experience is more determinate, but only because it is ‘closer’ to
the conceptual categories of a subject than its previous incarnation; conversely,  the new
subject  of  experience  is  equally  ‘closer’ to  its  object  due  to  the  re-evaluation  of  the
standards through which the latter is understood. While the perpetual re-evaluation of our
cognitive standards should entail that an absolutizing conception of subjectivity is never
reached, this would then negate the conception of subject-object identity that grounds the
vertical dimension of experience. Hegel’s conception of experience resolves this problem
by propelling itself towards the  absolutization  of the more restricted relation of subject-
object identity that occurs in this vertical dimension: “By such mischievous means […],
Hegel secures from himself the priority of the concept that then emerges at the other end as
the conclusion of the entire work”.20 In Hegel, the “motor” of the dialectic is that of non-
identity, yet this is only possible because subject-object identity has been posited at the
outset.
With this example in mind, we now have a better idea regarding the intertwinement
of both dimensions of experience, each of which are equally important to Adorno: “From
Kant, then, we get the transcendental structures of experience, whereas Hegel can explain
the  nature of  our  experiential  engagements,  engagements  by subjects  in  the conceptual
activity  of  knowing  particular  objects”.21 Adorno’s  conception  of  spiritual  experience
privileges the aspects of each dimension that are diminished or outright excluded by their
respective  thinkers.  In  the  vertical  dimension,  Adorno  is  concerned  with  the  very
independence of object to subject, which Kant diminishes by delimiting the thing-in-itself
to the noumenal realm: “There is a moment in Kant, and this was mobilized against him by
Hegel,  which  secretly  regards  the  in-itself  beyond  the  concept  as  something  wholly
20 Adorno, Lectures on Negative Dialectics, 184.
21 O’Connor, Adorno’s Negative Dialectic, 17.
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indeterminable,  as  null  and void”.22  Conversely,  in  the  lateral  dimension the  object  is
stripped of its historically-sedimented particularity while it is transformed into its concept:
in our haste to leap towards the object’s essential character, the latter’s actual existence –
and thus its possible non-identity with what we assume to be its essence –  is conveniently
passed-over.
The concern with object-independence and the individual particular both fall under
 the  heading  of  ‘prioritizing’ the  object.   This  priority  is  guaranteed  by  the  latter’s
preponderance in relation to subject: there are aspects of the object that are both necessary
in  the  constitution  of  experience,  yet  irreducible  to  the  conceptual  machinations  of
subjectivity.   Prioritizing the object thus involves unifying both the latter’s vertical  and
lateral aspects through the concept of non-conceptuality: the non-identity between subject
and  object  in  the  vertical  dimension  is  what  prompts  the  activity  within  the  lateral
dimension  towards  self-correction,  which  becomes  the  process  of  discovering  the
determinate  ways  in  which  subject  and  object  differ  within  their  particular  historical
configuration.  The end product  of spiritual  experience is  the reflection of the universal
within the particular, but unlike idealism the particular now reflects the universal on the
basis of their relation of non-identity; as such, the individual particular is preserved insofar
as  its  “essence” is  now construed as  that  which  cannot  be  immediately identified with
higher concepts. 
For Adorno, the transcendental structure of experience is necessarily one of non-
identity between subject and object, for otherwise knowledge would be tautological in the
sense that what is developed in the lateral dimension of conceptual activity is nothing more
than a re-iteration of its conditions of possibility, which are to be subsequently found in the
vertical dimension. The transcendental subject – as a guarantor of the inverse structure, of
the identity between essence and existence – is itself unchanging insofar as it is prior to the
temporality of lived experience.
22 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics (Un-Official Translation by Dennis Redmond), 16-18.
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1.4 Transcendental Subjectivity and the Tautological Structure of Experience:
The law-like  nature  of  the  object’s  dependence  on  subject  is  established by the
concept  of  transcendental  subjectivity:  reality  is  to  be  understood  as  a  whole  only  in
relation to the  unity of consciousness from which this ‘whole’ can be established. If the
totality that mediates the objects in the vertical dimension of experience is meant to be
rendered intelligible through conceptual re-adjustment in the lateral  dimension, then the
subject that structures the vertical dimension must be  rationally determinable within the
lateral one: in order to correct itself, the subject must possess an understanding of what it is
correcting. Yet if the subject must objectify itself in order to engage in the type of self-
reflection that is necessary for conceptual re-adjustment, the non-conceptual character of
objects becomes an obstacle insofar as the subject, now reflecting upon itself as an object,
might very well be irreducible to the concepts that are supposed to seize it totally. In other
words, the subject that is merely reduced to object is a subject that has not been adequately
conceptualized:  in  this  case,  the  subject  becomes  the  historically-contingent  individual
particular,  which  idealism  subsequently  considers  to  be  an  unsuitable  ground  for  the
possibility of knowledge. This is why in idealism, “taking as one’s point of departure the
pure immediacy of the ‘this thing there’, which is presumably what is most certain, does
not get one beyond the contingency of the individual person who simply exists”.23 In order
to guarantee that our experience of objects – and consequently, subjects – is not contingent,
idealism presents the transcendental subject as the necessary condition of experience itself:
as  a  result,  what  is  encountered  within experience  is  guaranteed its  conceptuality  by a
unified subject that is  prior to experience.  This ensures that the concept of transcendental
subjectivity provides a rational foundation for the immediacy of experience, and it must do
so by operating prior to our lived experience of immediacy. 
Yet for Adorno, this direct path from immediacy to mediation is a false one. If the
transcendental subject is an immaterial condition of all possible knowledge, then it follows
that this form of subjectivity resides outside of the historically-mediated, factical sphere of
23 Adorno, Hegel: Three Studies, 63.
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experience:  “as  pure  apperception24,  subject  should  be  the  absolutely  Other  of  all
existents”.25 Adorno agues that objects only appear as given within the empirical experience
of particular, living individuals. The concept of the given in its traditional form – which is
meant to account for the way in which we experience things immediately – gains its initial
meaning from our experience of facticity:  yet once the given object is constituted through
conceptual means, its immediate character is negated. This entails that the subject of the
given cannot be a transcendental one, as nothing can be “given” to a subject that is prior to
empirical experience itself: “No subject emancipated from anything empirical can ever be a
form for the given; to no such subject can something be given (referring to “it” as “it” or
“him”  is  already  problematic);  none  can  receive  such  content  in  whatever  manner”.26
Despite  idealism’s  attempt  to  establish  empirical  subjectivity  on  the  basis  of  the
transcendental character of experience,  there  remains a relation of non-identity between
empirical and transcendental forms of subjectivity, caused by the existence of the given –
immediacy – within idealism’s conceptually-determined account of experience.
 Transcendental  subjectivity  cannot  be prioritized as a  condition of possibility  of
experience if there are aspects of factical experience that are irreducible to it. Because these
aspects of experience must also be rationally accounted for, the idealist must do so without
recourse to the concepts which derive from empirical understandings of subjectivity such as
psychology.  If  not,  then  idealism  would  have  to  employ  two  antinomic  forms  of
subjectivity in order to develop a richer account of experience. For Adorno it is here that
the  idealist  has  a  chance  to  incorporate  a  corrective  to  the  concept  of  transcendental
subjectivity, as the irreducibility of the experience of the living subject to transcendental
concepts  and categories  serves  as  an objective “block”,  one which requires  the idealist
conception of subjectivity to be corrected if  it  is  to be surmounted without recourse to
abstraction.  With  the  dismissal  of  empirical  subjectivity  as  an  irreducible  aspect  of
24 The term “pure apperception” is taken from Kantian terminology, where it is meant to signify the 
transcendental subject.
25 Theodor W. Adorno, Critical Models, (New York City, NY: Columbia University Press, 2005), 255.
26 Theodor W. Adorno, Against Epistemology (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2013), 142.
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experience27, the critical function of concepts – their ability to reveal the deficiencies of
other concepts that they are configured around – is now negated: both empirical and formal
concepts cannot actually be configured around each other without becoming simplified in
order to make room for the intricacies of the other. The irrational contingencies of lived
experience – what is given in administered society –  cannot be properly criticized from the
viewpoint of a subject that is prior to it, just as a formalized account of experience cannot
merely be criticized from the isolated viewpoint of the living individual. By digging an
insurmountable  gap  between  the  empirical  and  the  intelligible,  idealism prevents  their
peripheral  concepts  from  having  the  necessary  relationship  of  proximity for  mutual
correction. The possible result of mutual correction – the discovery of the subject’s real
dependence on the object – becomes blocked from view:
Idealism becomes false when it mistakenly turns the totality of labor into something existing in 
itself, when it sublimates its principle into a metaphysical one, into the actus purus of spirit, and 
tendentially  transfigures  something  produced  by  human  beings,  something  fallible  and  
conditioned, along with labor itself, which is the suffering of human beings, into something  
eternal and right […] one might surmise that the extension of spirit to become totality is the  
inversion of  the recognition that  spirit  is  precisely not  an isolated principle,  not  some self-
sufficient substance, but rather a moment of social labor, the moment that is separate from  
physical labor. But physical labor is necessarily dependent on something other than itself, on 
nature. Labor – and in the last analysis its reflective form, spirit, as well – cannot be conceived 
without the concept of nature, any more than can nature without labor: the two are distinct from 
and mediated by one another at the same time.28
As we can see in the passage above, the empirical conception of the given plays a
decisive role in experience,  similar to that of nature within the realm of human activity: on
the basis of its relation of  externality to the subject, the given objects of experience are
what the latter must sharpen its concepts against if they are to cut through to the “core” of
27 For Hegel, the moment in experience in which the subject understands itself empirically is only 
meaningful insofar as it is to be negated through the conceptual movement which leads to the 
constitution of Absolute Spirit. As such, the empirical subject is merely an incarnation of reason that 
has yet to be actualized; sociologically-speaking, this manifests itself in the necessity to assimilate 
empirical individuals into institutions which are meant to “rationalize” their behavior.
28 Adorno, Hegel: Three Studies,  23.
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reality –  the thing-in-itself. By presupposing subject-object identity, idealists such as Kant
imagine their concepts to be sharpened from the outset, in the sense that they are eternally-
valid;  on the other hand, idealists like Hegel believed that the possibility of sharpening
one’s concepts in such a way was already present in reality. In both cases, the result is that
the given plays a diminished role in experience: in Kant the given is reduced to what cannot
be cut-through by concepts tout court – the thing-in-itself –, while in Hegel the negation of
the given is already embedded in its concept. While Adorno agrees that the given must be
negated  if  experience  is  to  culminate  in  more  determinate  knowledge,  the  idea  of
embedding  this  necessity  in  a  concept  before  the  concept  itself  is  experienced  in  its
actuality is another way of subordinating appearance to essence: we encounter the given on
the  basis  of  pre-established  expectations,  despite  the  fact  that  the  quality  of  givenness
entails that the existence of the object precedes these very expectations. In idealism, the
foundation  from  which  subject  and  object  can  be  identified  is  treated  as  a  “monistic
principle of world explanation, which by its sheer form promotes the primacy of a spirit
which dictates that principle”.29 Primacy is accorded to consciousness because the means
through which it can dictate its “monistic principle”  are already present within it; this is
necessary in idealism, as it is the only way that the immediately-given world can become
intelligible to a transcendental subject who resides outside of the immediacy of factical
experience. 
Positing  the  existence  of  a  transcendental  subject  inverses  the  traditional,
rationalistic account of experience, which departs from the givenness of the particular and
ascends to  the  universal.  In  the  rationalistic  account,  the  transcendental  subject  –  as  a
formal conception of subjectivity – must be regarded as the end-point of experience insofar
as one must first experience the empirical world in order to then purge its various contents
from subjectivity,  consequently  purifying  it  from the  contingencies  that  stem from the
living individual’s particular spatio-temporal situation. Yet in idealism, the transcendental
subject is present at the outset of experience, as the schema through which experience and
its objects are rendered immediately “presentable” to consciousness. Idealism cannot allow
29 Adorno, Against Epistemology, 183.
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for any other conception of subjectivity in its account of experience, as only transcendental
subjectivity guarantees subject-object identity. Subjective idealism thus falls into the same
“temporal”  impasse  as  Hegel:  subject-object  identity  is  both  the  condition  on  which
adequate notions of truth and reality are  possible, as well  as what is  finally discovered
through our experience of truth and reality. In other words, the transcendental subject – now
the  locus  of  subject-object  identity  –   is  both  the  point  of  departure  and  arrival  for
philosophical  investigation:  experience thus unfolds in circular  fashion.  Adorno did not
mistake this circularity for anything dialectical. Quoting Nietzsche: “it consists in confusing
the last [for] the first”.30 This temporal impasse entails that experience in idealism can only
be  positively  construed. Experience is positive in the sense that it unfolds  in accordance
with a  pre-established  relationship between our subjectivity and the objective world; as
such, there is nothing outside of the subject that can negate its own employed concepts
since those concepts are the sole guarantee of anything that is “outside” of the subject in the
first  place.  As  experience’s  points  of  arrival  and  departure  are  the  same,  there  is  no
possibility of straying from a singular path: the knowledge derived from idealist accounts
of experience is effectively tautological, namely by “the limitation of its total dominance to
what it itself has already prepared and formed”.31 
In idealism, what is immediately given in experience cannot actually problematize
our conceptual  apparatus,  because  the  given  is  already  identified  with  the  conceptual
categories that constitute it; any negative – or non-identical –  moment within experience is
but a transitory step towards identification between object and concept.  The reason for
which negative aspects of experience  cannot  have the final world in the determination of
the subject-object relation is because they express a fundamental relation of  non-identity
between subject and object. Yet if the foundational structure of experience is understood to
be  one  of  non-identity  between  subject  and  object,  idealism’s  central  project  becomes
untenable.
  
30 Adorno, Against Epistemology, 18.
31 Ibid,  11;  While the object of the original quote is mathematics, Adorno uses mathematical 
knowledge as an example for the tautology of all knowledge derived from abstract first principles.
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1.5 Subject-Object Identity and Reification
The failure to provide a rationally-grounded foundation for subject-object identity
condemns consciousness to navigating the gap between subjectivity and objectivity instead
of unifying them, as non-identity between subject and object blocks the possibility of total
integration of object into concept from the outset. Never truly reaching objectivity through
conceptual readjustment in the lateral dimension of experience, consciousness then retreats
into subjectivity, where autonomous reason feigns immediate mastery of the world within
the  vertical  dimension by forcefully  integrating  its  possible  objects  into  pre-established
conceptual categories. If the autonomy of reason is an essential by-product32 of subject-
object identity,  and that subject-object identity is presupposed at the outset of the idealist
project,  then  idealism  must  preserve  this  autonomy  at  all  costs:  “mind’s  claim  to
independence announces its claim to domination”.33
The  priority  of  the  transcendental  subject  over  the  particular  object  necessarily
transforms objects in their state of possibility – what they could become in this particular
historical context – into mere reflections of the means through which subjectivity already
understands itself:  “Traditional philosophy believes that it knows the unlike by likening it
to itself, while in doing so it really knows itself only”.34 The conceptual categories through
which subjectivity  understands  itself  are  treated  by  the  latter  as  given,  as  they  present
themselves  as  the  sole  means  of  conferring  immediate  intelligibility  to  the  aspects  of
subjectivity  that  cannot  be  experienced  directly  insofar  as  they  are  constitutive of
experience itself. As the object is posterior to the subject in idealism, it must reflect the
conceptual  categories  which  grant  it  the  necessary  solidity  it  requires  to  be  given
immediately in experience. The objectivity conjured by this reflection then becomes the
second pole of the subject-object relation: objectivity is thus construed as totally external to
subject on the basis of its immediate character.  It is in this sense that subjectivity and
objectivity become identical: on one hand, the givenness of the object in experience – what
is  supposed to  differentiate  it  from subject  –  is  but  the mirror-image of  the  subjective
32 Or in Adornian parlance, a “necessary illusion”.
33 Adorno, Critical Models, 246.
34 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 153.
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concepts that have constituted it; on the other, “The solidity of the epistemological ego, the
identity of self-consciousness, is obviously modeled after the unreflected experience of the
enduring, identical object”.35
 By “likening the unlike to itself”36, subjectivity’s coercive manipulation of objects
into  its  conceptual  schema  signals  its  retreat  from  reality:  if  identity-thinking  is
characterized by the assignment of concepts to objects by identifying  the latter with the
determinations of the former, it loses its rational character once the need for identification
takes precedence over  questions regarding the subjects’  capacity to  identify in  the first
place. The loss of rationality is signaled by the reversal of the traditional relation between
identity-thinking and external reality:  “Non-identity wants to say what something is, while
identity thinking says what it falls under, of what it is an exemplar or representative, thus
what  it  is  not  itself”.37 By  projecting  itself  into  the  object,  subjectivity  artificially
strengthens what was originally guaranteed – but never fulfilled –  by its founding subject-
object relation: the identity between the concept and the thing in itself. Mind-independent
objectivity  now mirrors  consciousness:  it  presents  itself  to  the subject  as a  unified and
coherent totality. Adorno understands this as product of mimetic rationality, which becomes
a  form of  reified  consciousness  when  it  posits  its  originating  act  as  the  condition  of
possibility of experience.
Adorno’s concept of reification is taken from Georg Lukacs, who first presents it in
“History and Class Consciousness”.38 For Lukacs, the concept signifies the propensity for
historically-transient phenomena such as social relations to solidify into purportedly eternal
aspects of human nature and sociality. In “History and Class Consciousness”, the concept of
reification presents the way in which relations of production under capitalism assume the
same “essential” character as the commodities that they produce. Yet reification does not
only occur “outside” of the subject; it is always accompanied by a similar process that takes
place  within  consciousness  itself.  Reified  consciousness  implies  that  the  transitory
35 Adorno, Critical Models, 256.
36 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 153.
37 Ibid, 152.
38 Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1972).
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character of thought becomes subjected to the object-like laws that it projects into external
reality in order to make the latter intelligible to itself.  In Adorno’s case, the concept of
reified  consciousness  is  employed  to  present  the  erasure  of  the  historically-mediated
character  of  experience  in  modernity:  reified  consciousness  deems  its  own  conceptual
categories  to  be  an  eternally-valid  structure  of  experience,  as  they  are  immediately
discernible  reflections  of  an  eternally-present  external  world.  For  Adorno,  this  is  the
common ground between  the  social  and  intellectual  aspects  of  reification:  “Philosophy
which  presents  reality  as  such  today  only  veils  reality  and  eternalizes  its  present
condition”.39 
Ironically, Adorno will then level the same accusation against Lukacs, the latter’s
concept of reification being problematic insofar as it falls victim to its own logic: “Lukacs’
postulate of a Being which transcends consciousness in its ontological indifference to the
activity of subjectivity  is  synonymous to a betrayal  of dialectics:  the idea of the trans-
subjectivity of being seems to restore a static dualism between being and consciousness”.40
In  Adorno’s  view,  Lukacs  presupposes  an  immediately-discernible  link  between  the
universality of the social totality and the particularity of false consciousness; as such, the
reified character of the social totality is not “determined” through the critical investigation
of particular modes of false consciousness, but instead presupposed as the totality from
which false consciousness is derived. In other words, experience does not commence with
false consciousness and ends in a more precise determination of the social totality’s reified
character, but instead begins with the reified social totality and ends with the determination
of false consciousness. The object of experience is conceptualized as reified before it is
even experienced in the first place: despite Lukacs’ intentions, the possibilities latent within
the object’s non-conceptuality are extinguished before experience begins.
In order to solve this issue, Adorno will  modify his conception of reification by
tying it to experience itself. In this sense, experience still departs with our encounter with a
reified, given object, but instead of merely providing an immediate image of the social
39 Adorno, “The Actuality of Philosophy”, Telos, 120.
40 Nicholas Tertulian, “Adorno-Lukacs: polémiques et malentendus”. Cités, 22 (2005): 205. 
(my translation).
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totality in which it appears, the non-conceptuality of the object instead pushes the subject to
determine it further by differentiating the object from its assigned concept. For example,
instead of pinning the concept of reification to a particular type of social relation, we could
instead experience the social relation in its non-identity to the type of reification that it
should be an exemplar of:  as a result,  the general concept of reification becomes more
determinate in relation to its object. The upshot is that we can then provide a more precise
account of our experience of reification in its actuality. The reified character of society is
thus  developed within  the  experience  of  a  particular  object  instead  of  presupposed  as
universal from the outset, and this development occurs within the context of subject-object
mediation. Unlike that of Lukacs, Adorno’s conception of reification must be understood as
a lack of reciprocity instead of a positive relation of domination between subject and object;
conversely, the possibility of reciprocity remains. If we accept Lukacs’ vision on the other
hand, then reification merely “is” and cannot be surmounted without the total upheaval of
society – which would consist of a forced reconciliation between subject and object.
Adorno’s  conception  of  reification  as  non-reciprocity  not  only  allows  us  to
understand  the  determinate  relations  between  false  consciousness  in  the  subject  and
reification  in  the  social  totality,  but  also  between  the  seemingly  opposing  accounts  of
experience  which  result  from  them:  “Philosophies  submit  to  reification  and  to  what
[Adorno] calls “identity thinking” when they simplify the reciprocity of experience, either
by assuming that the object can be mastered in its totality by the subject (idealism), or by
attempting to remove the subject from the process of knowledge altogether (positivism)”.41
The  subject  of  reified  consciousness  either  identifies  subjectivity  under objectivity  by
removing  the  qualities  that  give  the  subject  its  irreducible  nature  in  relation  to  object
(positivism); or it does the opposite by identifying the givenness of the object with the
subject’s  conceptual  categories,  thus  extinguishing  the  possibility  of  apprehending  the
object  in  its  irreducibility  to  cover-concepts  (idealism).  As  the  objective  process  of
reification  represents  the  strained  and  coercive  establishment  of  an  identity  relation
41 Jared Miller, “Phenomenology’s Negative Dialectic”, The Philosophical Forum Quarterly 40, no.1 
(2009): 104.
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between  subjects  and  objects  within  society,  its  manifestation  within  consciousness  is
tasked with covering-up the antinomic relation between both; this is the function of false
consciousness within the “totally administered society”, and it is why Adorno considers
positivism and idealism to be its exemplars. In either case, reified consciousness is barred
from critical reasoning because its thoughts become indistinguishable from the uncritical
conception of reality that they have produced. Once we understand the subject-object split
and its  corresponding philosophies as a  part  and parcel  of  the process  of  reification in
modernity, it then becomes apparent that they cannot offer rational accounts of experience
insofar as they prevent their  subjects from  fully experiencing reality. And if  the subject
cannot experience reality in its  fullness,  then it  cannot possibility  develop the requisite
understanding of the latter that is necessary for the establishment of social critique; in other
words, the rational motives behind subject-object identity start to disintegrate. 
Because idealism fails to generate a rational account of subject-object identity, it
immediately loses hold of the object that it initially aimed to seize: a totalizing conception
of  reality.  Adorno  announces  this  loss  in  the  first  sentence  of  his  inaugural  lecture:
“Whoever chooses philosophy as a profession today must first reject the illusion that earlier
philosophical enterprises began with: that the power of thought is sufficient to grasp the
totality of the real”.42 The loss of the terrain once held by idealist systems was not regained;
it  was  either  surrendered  to  empirical  sciences  such  as  psychology,  or  scorched  and
discarded as mere metaphysical speculation. Contrary to the ‘internal’ aspect mentioned
above43, this consists of the external aspect of philosophy’s inclusion within the crisis of
idealism: as a discipline, it is now be forced to re-evaluate its own capabilities in relation to
this significant loss of terrain. Much like that of idealism, the philosophical profession’s
response to the crisis was a reactionary one: it took what little land it had left and hastily
tried to delimit it into various possible groundings for further philosophical investigation.
Philosophy’s self-sabotage was conditional upon its inability to account for the  changing
nature of reality in the modern age; instead of adapting itself in order to critically assess
42 Adorno, “The Actuality of Philosophy”, Telos, 120.
43 Philosophy retains the same impulse to liken what is “other” to itself.
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new historical phenomena, it aimed to re-root them into barren soil: the structures of a
transcendental subject or mind-independent objectivity. Stuck in the gap between subject
and object, contemporary philosophies could only point to isolated versions of either as a
possible future foundation: while irrationalist currents such as fundamental ontology clung
to a type of subjectivism that eschews systematicity in its presupposition of the category of
totality44, their positivist counterparts clung to the scientistic idea of an immediately-given
empirical reality as the condition of all certain knowledge.45 In any case, philosophy’s key
concepts  were  reified  due  to  their  immutable  character:  transcendental  subjectivity  and
myth serve as reified conceptions of mind and nature, as to understand the latter concepts in
their historicity would render them contingent. It is this lack of contingency that conversely
provides  the  stable  ground from which further  philosophical  investigation can arise.  In
philosophy  as  in  idealism,  an  unchanging  mental  schematic  can  project  itself  into  an
equally unchanging world due to the immutable nature of their identity-relation: “It is a
fallacy that what persists is truer than what perishes. The order, which models the world
into disposable property, is passed off as the world itself. The invariance of the concept,
which would not be unless the temporal determinacy of what is grasped under concepts
were ignored, is confused with the unchangeability of being itself.”46 
Once  truth  –  seen  as  a  correlation  between  subject  and  object  –  becomes
historicized, then so does its structure of subject-object identity; yet once the subject-object
structure is historicized,  it  can no longer be one of identity.  This is  because history,  in
accordance  with  its  concept,  implies  the  renewal  of  qualitative  change:  “[history]  is  a
movement that gains its true character through what appears in it as new”.47 The existence
of  ‘the  new’ strengthens  the  case  for  non-conceptuality:  historically-mediated  objects
cannot be totally grasped by old concepts, as that which the old concept was meant to grasp
is no longer what the subject has in front of its very eyes. It is thus non-conceptuality that
underpins the givenness of the object within experience, as objects are given immediately
44 Adorno, “The Actuality of Philosophy”, Telos, 123.
45 Ibid, 124-125.
46 Adorno, Against Epistemology, 17.
47 Theodor Adorno, “The Idea of Natural History”, Telos, no.60 (1984): 111.
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to  the  subject  as  things  which  have  yet to  be  adequately  conceptualized. This  non-
conceptual feature pushes the subject to actively modify its concepts in order to apprehend
the very specificity of the every-changing, historically-mediated objectivity that surrounds
it.  The  non-conceptuality  of  the  object  thus  precedes  the  autonomy  of  the  subject,  as
subjectivity is only autonomous as long as it  posits its autonomy over something that is
already external to it. If objects necessarily possess some aspects of non-conceptuality due
to  their  historically  mediated  nature,  then  the  subject  is  dislodged from its  position  of
priority, blocking the possibility of subject-object identity.
The non-conceptuality of the object is what allows Adorno to prioritize the latter in
experience:  as  non-conceptuality  is  predicated  on  the  object’s  historically-mediated
character, prioritizing the object on the basis of its non-conceptuality is the only way of
according to priority to objectivity without reifying it into something eternally-enduring. In
other words, objects are experienced as inadequately conceptualized precisely because their
historically-mediated  character  graces  them  with  type  of  contingency  that  must  be
discarded if we are to merely ‘pin’ concepts to them. By attempting to integrate what it
considers to be given objects of consciousness into an eternally-valid conceptual schematic
– all while ignoring the fact that their very givenness is historically mediated –, idealism
has  betrayed its  original  intent:  what  it  thought  to  be  immediately  understandable  was
precisely what it had to problematize from the outset. Instead of illuminating the objects by
problematizing  their  non-conceptuality,  idealism furthers  obscures  them by treating this
essential  feature  as  a  mere  moment  to  be  surpassed  in  the  further  development  of
conceptual thinking.
1.6 Subject-Object Mediation and The Priority of the Object
The prioritization of the object is one of Adorno’s most significant commitments: by
structuring  experience  on  the  basis  of  non-identity,  it  becomes  the  sole  condition  of
possibility for the experience of the qualitatively new. The object can only be properly
accounted for in experience if we follow two interrelated guidelines: the first is that we are
to understand the individual subject as one of the object’s constitutive moments, and not its
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only moment; because the object’s “material” moment only becomes significant within the
immaterial, mediated confines of conceptual thinking, the object cannot be understood as
what is left after subjectivity is subtracted. As the moment of subjective constitution is no
longer  foundational in  experience,  the  object  gains  the  right  to  its  moment  of  non-
conceptuality.  Here,  the  object  possesses  a  constitutive  role  over  subjectivity  without
having to determine the latter entirely, as conceptual thinking still establishes the motor of
spiritual  experience.  To prioritize  the  object  is  thus  to  guarantee  the  co-constitution of
subject and object in experience, as one cannot be excluded from or reduced to the other.
Only constitutive subjectivity’s self-professed autonomy over the object allows it to either
collapse  the  latter  into  itself  or  exclude  it  entirely  from  conceptuality;  in  this  sense,
prioritizing the object means that we must protect it  from the overreach of constitutive
subjectivity as well as the reified conception of first nature that serves as its complementary
concept of objectivity: “Knowledge of the object is brought closer by the act of the subject
rending the veil  it  weaves about  the object.  It  can do this  only when, passive,  without
anxiety,  it  entrusts  itself  to  its  own experiences.  In  the  places  where  subjective  reason
senses subjective contingency,  the primacy of  the object  shimmers through:  that  in  the
object which is not a subjective addition”.48
The second guideline flows from the first: if we are to ‘entrust ourselves to our own
experiences’,  then  we must  understand  experience  as  something  that  pertains  to  living
individuals  instead of  a  transcendental  subject.  In  other  words,  the prioritization of the
object is achieved by limiting the subject’s capacity for domination by focusing on its own
objectivity, encompassing its real  limitations within the empirical world. For Adorno, the
experience  of  the  universal  is  dependent  on  the  prior  existence  of  a  particular  living
individual instead of a transcendental subject, the latter now losing its position of priority to
what  is actual: “The individual  subject  […] is  an  integral  component  of  the  empirical
world. Its function, however, its capacity for experience – which the transcendental subject
lacks, for no purely logical entity could have any sort of experience – is in truth much more
48 Adorno, Critical Models, 254.
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constitutive than the role idealism ascribed to the transcendental subject”.49 In this passage,
we can see that the transcendental subject is not an actual subject of experience, but rather
the latter’s condition of possibility: as such, there is no possibility of non-identity between a
transcendental subject and the objects whose appearance it guarantees.  This is problematic
because the “new” that appears within a particular context of historical sedimentation is
conditional  on  the  non-identity  between  the  subjects  and  objects  contained  within  it:
without this form of non-identity, we simply grasp possibly new objects with outmoded
concepts.  In  other  words,  the  subject  can  employ  universal  concepts  in  order  to
meaningfully engage with historically-mediated particulars precisely because it itself is a
historically-mediated particular: as the individual’s use of concepts is contingent, they can
be subjected to the type of errors that give us a more determinate picture of the context in
which they appeared. Adorno believes that the actual experiences of individuals can shed
more light on the social totality than a subject that is prior to it because he understands  the
spiritual experience of the living individual as a cryptic reflection of the type of larger
objective tendencies that are either presupposed by idealism or considered “epistemically
unavailable”  by  positivism:  “According  to  its  present,  and  polemical,  status  in  the
philosophy of history, unreduced subjectivity is capable of functioning more objectively
than objectivistic reductions. […] At times subject, as unrestricted experience, will come
closer  to  object  than  the  residuum  filtered  and  curtailed  to  suit  the  requirements  of
subjective reason”.50
The priority of the object is meant to ensure that the dialectic – the co-constitution
of  subject  and  object  –  remains  grounded  within  a  materialistic  framework:  only  by
prioritizing the object can we do justice to subjectivity in its actuality; only by prioritizing
an actual, living subject over its transcendental incarnation can we do justice to objectivity
itself.           
         
                        ***    




Failing to Secure Experience: Positivism and Phenomenology
2.1 Positivism and Phenomenology as Manifestations of “Non-Real Consciousness”
While contemporary idealist currents were deeply affected by the crisis, Adorno was
more interested in its various philosophical reactions, often coming from schools of thought
that have positioned themselves against subjective idealism from the outset. Such attempts
are in vain: the failure to recognize the crisis of idealism as a larger objective tendency is
what  permits  anti-idealist  currents  to  inadvertently  employ  idealist  concepts  in  their
respective reconstructions of experience.  The dialectical nature of these failed attempts –
the fact that they aim to criticize idealism’s features without knowing that they are already
inside of its conceptual framework –  is of key interest to Adorno as they represent inner
contradictions within the overarching logic of idealism.  Like quicksand, the latter compels
those  who  are  trapped  inside  to  try  and  escape;  once  escape  is  attempted  through
immediately intuitive means, the victim only falls deeper into the trap.
For  Adorno,  the  pertinent reactions  to  idealism’s  crisis  stem from two  separate
currents: positivism and Husserlian phenomenology. Both currents share common ground
insofar as they fail to properly account for givenness in experience. Their attempts to found
experience on a particular version of givenness fail in the same way, as neither is developed
while taking the other into account. Positivism accords priority to what is given empirically
by  reducing the subject’s cognitive role in experience:  objects are reduced to what our
senses take them to be, thus excluding the possibility of experiencing aspects of objectivity
that  exist  without  being  immediately  present  to  our  senses  –  society  being  Adorno’s
primary example. Phenomenology, on the other hand,  privileges the givenness of the  a
priori concepts  that  frame our  intuitions  of  empirical  objects  by bracketing the latter’s
empirically-given aspects.
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Because  both  conceptual  and  empirical  givens  possess  determinate  roles  in
experience, each current will have to make its privileged aspect also account for what has
been simultaneously excluded, and it is precisely in this moment of “translation” that their
respective concepts fall into antinomy. The result of each critique is a particular, negative
image of what makes experience possible. The critique of positivism reveals to what extent
conceptuality  is  necessary  by  showing  how  our  experience  of  empirical  objects  is
diminished when the cognitive role of the subject is artificially limited; while the critique of
phenomenology cements the necessity of the empirical moment of experience by showing
to  what  extent  concepts  themselves  are  dependent  on  the  presupposition of  material
objectivity. The failure of both currents to rationally account for experience demonstrates
the objective need for subject-object mediation in the latter’s reconstruction: without it,
experience remains fragmented within the dualism of the empirical and the intelligible.  
Adorno is more concerned with the failure of Husserlian phenomenology than that
of positivism, as Husserl’s attempt at resolving the crisis possessed critical potential while
that  of  positivism did  not:  Husserl  granted  his  subject  the  ability  to  bracket  empirical
givenness in order to mediate the given object on the basis of its conceptuality, which is a
step towards an account of experience that does not found itself on a reified conception of
mind-independent  objectivity.  In  order  to  understand  phenomenology’s  early  critical
potential, we must first reconstruct positivism’s failure at providing the conditions for a
critical conception of subjectivity.
2.2 Positivism and the Restriction of Experience to Facticity 
 Despite the fact that his criticism of positivism is established in a more fragmentary
manner than those of idealism and its phenomenological variants, it is possible to sketch the
general idea of positivism employed by Adorno if we limit ourselves to the problem of
constitutive subjectivity. Positivism’s distinguishing experiential feature is its commitment
to  securing  the  criterion  of  truth within  what  is  independent  of  consciousness;  what  is
independent  of  consciousness  is  thus  all  that  we  can  encounter  within experience.  Put
simply, positivism rejects the possibility of experiencing what is constitutive of experience
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itself,  while idealism grounds its critique of knowledge on the necessity of this type of
experience.  Positivism  widens  the  gap  between  essence  (constituens)  and  appearance
(constitutum)  by concerning itself  solely with appearances in  its  account of experience.
When ignored in this way, essence is effectively reduced to what it makes possible: what is
essential to experience is what appears to us as immediately given to our senses. This is
problematic for Adorno, as “[The category of totality]  is not separate from the facts but is
immanent to them as their mediation”.51 As in Hegel, the universal that is reflected from the
object is none other than the totality in which it is contained; as such, even the most partial
and isolated facts  are  “spiritual”  in  the sense  that  they are intrinsically  connected  to  a
constitutive whole. 
Adorno  cannot  criticize  positivism  by  positing the  necessity  of  the  concept  of
essence in the reconstruction of unreduced experience, as this would subsequently require
him to found the possibility of experience on an essential principle which resides within the
latter’s supra-historical “background”. Adorno takes the dialectical route instead: while the
existence of such an “essential” whole is problematic, it is only so when confronted with
the logic of appearance.  While it  is possible to construct such a whole theoretically,  to
determine it in its  actuality is problematic because we must evaluate something that is –
much like a particular object – historically contingent, ye simultaneously  essential in the
sense that  it  a  functions like a  concept  as  well:  while  the social  totality  is  a  historical
contingency,  the  alienated  subject  still  experiences  it  as  an  immutable condition  of
existence. In other words, the antinomy is found in the fact that there now exists something
that  seems to  simultaneously  exceed all  other  appearing  existents.  Adorno’s  critique  of
positivism – and his subsequent conception of spiritual experience –  thus proceeds by
preserving the idealist distinction that is erased in order to render positivism’s account of
experience coherent: “Not the least significant of the differences between the positivist and
dialectical conceptions is that positivism […] will only allow appearance to be valid, whilst
dialectics  will  not  allow  itself  to  be  robbed  of  the  distinction  between  essence  and
51 Theodor Adorno et al., The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemman  
Educational Books, 1981), 12.
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appearance”.52 Instead of going the idealist route and merely according primacy to essence
over appearance in the constitution of knowledge, Adorno will show how an unreduced
account  of  experience  unfolds  on  the  basis  of  the  very  tension  between both  of  these
concepts. Just like the example of sugar and salt, I understand more about objects and my
particular  way of apprehending them once I  get  a  grasp on how I can possibly fail  to
apprehend  them  immediately:  when  the  immediacy  of  my  cognitive  act  recedes,  the
situation in which the act takes place comes to the fore. As this situation itself cannot be
presupposed, the critical mediation of the object is the only possible path we can take if we
are to make this situation intelligible in the first place.
In order for Adorno’s critique of positivism to hold, he must provide an explanation
for how essences can appear  within experience in order to then  be experienced by living
individuals. Adorno’s response to this problem is simultaneously anti-positivistic and anti-
idealistic:  “Dialectical thought counters the suspicion of what Nietzsche termed nether-
worldly”, and it does so “with the assertion that concealed essence is non-essence”.53 Here
Adorno is arguing that the ‘essence’ which remains concealed within the supra-historical
“background” of  experience  as  a  first  principle  is  not  essential  at  all.  On the contrary,
essences  are  no longer  fixed outside of experience,  but  are  instead manifestations  of a
historical  process  of  becoming,  the  results  of  which  can  only  be  determined  within
experience itself: “One must adhere to Hegel's statement that essence must appear”.54 The
dialectical response to the problem of a reality behind appearances consists of mediating
between essence and appearance by according a temporal character to essence –  one which
would normally be reserved to the phenomenal aspect of objects. Essence thus becomes
intelligible within the temporal logic of appearance instead of dictating it from the other
side of the ontological gap: eternity. While Adorno agrees with the fact that we experience
objects as appearances, it is the decryption of these very appearances that leads us to their
“essence”: now understood as sedimented history, what is essential about an object is found
in  the  reconstruction  of  the  process  of  sedimentation  itself.  Adorno’s  response  thus




preserves  the  distinction  between  essence  and  appearance,  but  sets  both  concepts  into
dialectical  motion  instead  of  digging  an  insurmountable  gap:  against  idealism,  Adorno
argues  that  essence  can  only  be  understood as  appearance;  against  positivism,  he  then
argues  that  appearance  –  what  is  given  –  is  only  meaningful  when  understood  in  its
essentiality, or within the context of its proper role in experience.
Unlike the positivist, Adorno is careful not to reduce essence to appearance in the
determination  of  the  former’s  experiential  role;  while  the  former  can  only  become
intelligible in its relation to the latter, the relation itself is one of difference: “Dialectical
thought,  irreconcilable  with  the  philosophical  tradition,  affirms  this  non-essence,  not
because of its power but instead it criticizes its contradiction of ‘what is appearing’ and,
ultimately,  its  contradiction  of  the  real  life  of  human  beings  […]  Totality  is  not  an
affirmative but rather a critical category”.55 The significance of the concept of essence is
thus  discovered  in  its  negative relation  to  the  content  of  appearance,  which  is  itself
temporal in two ways: as the result of a process of historical sedimentation, as well as being
experienced by the subject in a processual manner. The sedimented character of the object
is the locus of its non-identity with concepts; it provides the context in which the solidity of
the concept – its seemingly eternal character – is called into question and subsequently
criticized. The exclusion of the concept of essence from experience negates the temporal
structure of the latter in both senses: as experience is reduced to what is immediately given
to the subject, the latter cannot engage in the type of conceptual re-adjustment that moves
beyond the object’s givenness; consequently,  the object cannot be experienced as the result
of a process of historical sedimentation.
2.3 The Lack of Self-Awareness in Positivistic Accounts of Experience
If ‘sticking to the facts’ entails that we cannot point to the totality that exceeds them,
then experience cannot be spiritual: “it is almost tautological to say that one cannot point to
the concept of totality in the same manner as one can point to the facts, from which totality
distances itself as a concept. That society does not allow itself to be nailed down as a fact
55 Adorno et al., The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, 11-12.
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actually only testifies to the existence of mediation”.56 While thinking of the social totality
as a fact confers an immediate intelligibility to its object, it overlooks the very aspect that
gives  the latter  its  specificity:  the fact  that  it  is  both constitutive  of and constituted  by
subjectivity. Without the ability to reflect on the subject-object relation, these two features
remain undifferentiated, thus condemning experience to one-dimensionality.
 If the possibility of self-criticism is a necessary aspect of understanding objectivity
without reifying it into what we merely  think it  is, positivism falls back into a form of
inverted subjectivism. By excluding the constitutive power of subjectivity from experience,
positivist methodology inadvertently protects the latter from being criticized, and by doing
so cannot possibly understand the extent to which its ‘givens’ are constructed through a
subjective process:  “Object is no more subjectless residuum than it is posited by subject.
The two conflicting determinations fit together: the residue, for which science settles as its
truth, are a result of its manipulative procedures that are subjectively organized. To define
what object is would in turn be itself part of that organization”.57 In this sense, Adorno’s
critique of positivistic methodology echoes that of Hegel, whose concept of reification is
“motivated by the idea that science is concerned less with the life of things than with their
compatibility with with its own rules”, insofar as “rational science […] trims objects down
to size and processes them until they fit into the institutionalized, ‘positive’ disciplines, and
does so in the service of its own ordering concepts and their immanent practicability and
lack of contradiction”.58
Adorno understands positivism as a form of subjectivism without a subject: as what
it is possible to experience is equated with the givenness of mind-independent objectivity,
subjectivity can only understand itself  in the limited way that  it  understands objects  in
general. This is of crucial importance to Adorno’s critique of society, as it is by departing
from the relation of non-identity between it and its particulars that we can criticize this
particular configuration of the social totality as a false universal. The actuality of the object
–  what  makes  it  a  particular  –   is  extinguished  when categorized  before  it  is  actually
56 Adorno et al., The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, 10-11.
57 Adorno, Critical Models, 253.
58 Adorno, Hegel: Three Studies, 73.
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experienced, and this is because the condition of possibility of the former is its containment
within the social totality, a concept which cannot be exhausted analytically. As positivistic
concepts  must conform to this  requirement,   the background in which the particular  is
individuated  is  transfigured  into  one  that  can  be  organized through  methodological
thinking. Unlike the idealist subject, the empirical individual is not granted its universality
on  the  basis  of  its  own  transcendence  in  relation  to  experience,  but  instead  on  the
transcendence of nature:
 The crucial difference between the dialectical and the positivistic view of totality is that the  
dialectical concept of totality is intended 'objectively', namely, for the understanding of every 
social individual observation, whilst positivistic systems theories wish, in an uncontradictory  
manner, to incorporate observations in a logical continuum, simply through the selection of  
categories as general  as possible.  In  so doing,  they do not recognize the highest  structural  
concepts as the precondition for the states of affairs subsumed under them.59
The particular individual is covered-over by the universality of its species because there is
nothing within our possible experience of individuals that grates against such a category:
they are merely perceived as particular amalgamations of contingent traits, each formalized
into sub-species. In other words, the fact that there is nothing essential about the experience
of the living individual is what allows positivism to merely chalk up individual experiences
in general as contingent; as such, the subject of experience is instead identified with the
naturalistic categories in which its  contingent traits are contained. In opposition to this,
Adorno encourages us to instead treat the “material moments originating in the real life
process of socialized human beings as essential and not merely contingent”.60
While scientific research concerns itself with what is merely contingent, it only does
so because it can bar the concept of essence from its epistemic vocabulary. Yet the concept
of essence is critical for scientific research: its problematic character sheds light on exactly
what  content  is being lost when experience is reduced to a formal principle that accords
priority  to  what  already  exists  in  the  realm  of  appearance.  Adorno  argues  for  the
interdependence of scientific research and philosophical investigation on the grounds that
59 Adorno et al., The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, 14.
60 Adorno, Hegel: Three Studies, 67.
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self-correction in regard to instruments and the self-reflection of their user are necessarily
intertwined,  be  it  within  social  scientific  practice  or  spiritual  experience.61 While  the
possibility  of  self-reflection  must  necessarily  precede  the  correction  of  methods  or
concepts,  for  the  positivist  “philosophy  becomes  solely  an  occasion  for  ordering  and
controlling the separate sciences, without being allowed to append anything from itself to
their findings”.62 Positivism thus insists on the very deficient conception of self-correction
that Hegel mentioned in the introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit, one in which
solely the “instrument” into taken into account instead of its user63:  self-correction thus
occurs within the context of a pre-established criterion of truth, the latter being reflected in
the very instruments prioritized by scientific methodology. A wider form of epistemic self-
correction – in the sense of re-evaluating the criterion of truth presupposed by the tools we
use to evaluate the world – would require the possibility of self-reflection, where the user
mediates between itself and its tools on the basis of the wider context in which both differ.
It  is  in  this  sense  that  philosophy  for  Adorno  takes  on  a  more  emphatic  role  towards
objectivity than the sciences:
Experience in the emphatic sense – the net of [non-mutilated] cognition, such as may 
serve  as  a  model  of  philosophy  –  differs  from science  not  through  a  higher  principle  or  
apparatus, but rather through the use which it makes of its materials, especially the conceptual  
(which as such match those of science), and through its position towards objectivity”64 […] 
The central difference lies far more in that the separate sciences accept their findings, at least 
their final and deepest findings, as indestructible and static, whereas philosophy perceives the 
first finding which it lights upon as a sign that needs unriddling.65
The fruitfulness of the philosophical position towards objectivity is found in the fact
that  it  can  account  for  the  non-conceptuality  of  the  object  in  experience  –  one  that  it
construes as a “sign that needs unriddling” – while in positivism it is not problematized at
all.  Despite  the  fact  that  the  object  gains  its  priority  in  experience  on  the  basis  of  its
61 Adorno, “The Actuality of Philosophy”, Telos, 127.
62 Ibid, 125.
63 Hegel, The Phenomenology of the Spirit, 49-51.
64 Adorno,  Against Epistemology, 45.
65 Adorno, “The Actuality of Philosophy”, Telos, 126.
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independence from the productive faculties of consciousness, the non-conceptuality of the
object is  only meaningful in  the sense of its  non-identity  with a  subject.  If  there is  no
essential role in experience for subjectivity, then positivism does not prioritize the object:
because positivism does not grant the concept of the ‘given’ the metaphysical context it
requires in order for conceptual movement to occur, experience merely departs and ends
with the object in its un-mediated givenness. Positivism thus takes the tautological structure
of idealism and merely converts it to the logic of appearance that governs the empirical
realm. 
2.4 The Potential of Phenomenology: The Subjective Mediation of the Given
Adorno’s appreciation of Husserl stems from the idea that the latter “recognized in
the meaning of the concept of the non-deductible given, as developed by positivist schools,
the  fundamental  problem  of  the  relationship  between  reason  and  reality”.66 For  both
thinkers, the irreducible givenness of empirical objects is problematic in the establishment
of a direct relation between reason and reality insofar as it represents an aspect of the latter
that  is  irreducible  to  consciousness.  Husserl  was  aware  that  an  enriched  account  of
experience could not employ mind-independent objectivity as its sole criterion of truth, as
that  which  presents itself  to  consciousness  as  fully  independent  is  merely  contingent,
serving no purpose in the establishment of the necessities that underpin experience:
The  essential  fault  in  empiricistic  argumentation  consists  of  identifying  or  confusing  the  
fundamental demand for a return to the ‘things themselves’  with the demand for legitimation of 
all  cognition by  experience. With his  comprehensible  naturalistic  constriction of  the limits  
bounding cognizable ‘things’, the empiricist simply takes experience to be the only act that is 
presentive of things themselves. But things are not simply mere things belonging to Nature, nor 
is actuality in the usual sense simply all of actuality; and the originary presentative act which 
we call experience is  relates only to actuality in Nature. To make identifications here and  
treat them as supposed truisms is to blindly push aside differences which can be given in the 
clearest  insight  […]  Simply  to  assert  that  all  judgements  admit  of,  indeed  even  demand,  
legitimation by experience without having previously submitted the essence of judgements to a 
66 Ibid, 122.
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study with  respect  to  their  fundamentally  different  species  and  without  having,  in  so  
doing,  considered  or  not  whether  that  assertion  is  counter-sensical:  that  is  a  ‘speculative  
construction a priori’  made no better by the fact that it happens to issue from the empiricistic 
camp.67
In  this  passage,  the  Husserlian  and  Adornian  critiques  of  positivism  and  its  “natural
attitude” intersect; for both, this account of experience limits itself to what is immediately
available to the empirical consciousness of the contingent individual without ever calling
this limitation into question. This leads to a subject who can assign given particulars under
traditional  analytical  categories,  but  cannot  determine  whether  such  an  ‘assignment’ is
actually legitimate in the first place. As Christian Skirke puts it, the positivistic conception
of truth “may be correct but cannot account for itself”.68  
In  its  inability  to  account  for  itself,  positivism lapses  into  a  form of  relativism
insofar as it cannot establish the aspects of experience that are necessary for the constitution
of truth. Husserl’s recourse against this form of relativism consists of a re-valorization of
the objectivity of truth: in other words, the validity of logical laws can be made intelligible
without reference to the experience of the particular, contingent individual. Jared Miller
breaks  down  Husserl’s  argument  into  3  claims:  “(1)  If  logical  laws  are  inductive
generalizations  drawn  from  empirical  observation,  then  their  validity  is  merely
probabilistic, which it is not; (2) if logical laws imply factual conditions, then their truth
would be contingent upon those facts, which it is not; and (3) the reduction of logic to
psychology  leads  invariably  to  relativism,  which  is  necessarily  self-defeating”.69 The
positivistic reduction of subject and object to contingency is what prevents the subject from
encountering essential aspects of experience – such as validity –  in their very  necessity;
conversely,  the objects  of  experience remain  contingent  because we cannot  develop an
understanding  of  them  in  their  essentiality,  or  the  necessary  way  that  they  relate  to
consciousness.  
67 Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological
Philosophy, (The Hague, NL: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1983), 36.
68 Christian Skirke, “Metaphysical Experience and Constitutive Error in Adorno’s ‘Meditations on      
Metaphysics’ ”, Inquiry 55, no.3 (2012) : 322.
69 Miller, “Phenomenology’s Negative Dialectic”, Philosophical Forum Quarterly, 105.
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So how do objects necessarily relate to consciousness in the constitution of truth,
and how do we determine this without employing the empirical character of the object as
the locus of such necessity? The method of phenomenological reduction is meant to solve
this issue by purging the object of all of its transcendent, empirically-given determinations
in order to paint a picture of how the latter necessarily presents itself  for consciousness –
instead of what we would think to be ‘for itself’. In other words, the object is stripped of the
reified layer of objectivity that results from the natural attitude’s positing of the former as
immediately given: 
We  put  out  of  action  the  general  positing  which  belongs  to  the  essence  of  the  natural  
attitude; we parenthesize everything which that positing encompasses with respect to being;  
thus the whole natural world which is continually ‘there for us’, ‘on hand’, and which will  
always  remain  there  according  to  consciousness  as  an  ‘actuality’ even  if  we  choose  to  
parenthesize  it  […]  I  am not  negating  this  ‘world’ as  though  I  were  a  sophist;  I  am not  
doubting  its  factual  being  as  though  I  were  a  skeptic;  rather,  I  am  exercising  the  
phenomenological  [epoche]  which  also  completely  shuts  me  off  from  any  judgment  
about spatiotemporal factual being”.70
While this  move seems to harbor a Hegelian motivation in  the sense that the object  is
understood as it appears “for consciousness”, the latter is extinguished because the result is
a product of subtraction instead of mediation. Once the empirical aspects of the object have
been  ‘bracketed’ by  consciousness,  what  is  left  of  the  object  –  its  ‘phenomenological
residue’ –  should present it in its irreducibility to the natural attitude of the positivistic
subject; in other words, while the empirical object is put into parentheses, its immanent
meaning  persists  as  a  conceptual  remainder.  While  this  remainder  is  the  product  of
conceptual mediation, Husserl presents it as being prior to mediation in order to employ it
as a foundation for our experience of objects. 
70 Husserl, Ideas I, 61.
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2.5 Husserl’s Idealism: Bundling-up Materiality and Ideality
Before  we  re-construct  Adorno’s  critique  of  Husserl,  we  must  first  make  a
disclaimer regarding the controversial status of Adorno’s claims. This particular critique of
Husserl  is  centered  around  the  latter’s  foundationalism,  which  Adorno  understood  as
expressive of a larger tendency in modern society: the necessity of a recourse to abstract
first principles in the re-construction of the withered experiences of living individuals. This
type of philosophical critique is polemical in the sense that it ties what Husserl considered
to  be  a  philosophical  project  to  a  set  of  social  processes  that  it  could  not  possibly
interrogate.  Yet  for  this  to  hold,  we  must  first  agree  with  the  idea  that  Husserl  is  a
foundationalist in the first place; unlike Adorno’s political charges, this is the actual source
of controversy.  As Jared Miller  points out,  this  type of claim is  by no means accepted
within the literature on the subject: “Edmund Husserl has emerged as a highly disputed
figure in the foundationalism debate that wages across the historiography of philosophy. A
number of scholars have attempted to defend Husserl against the charge of foundationalism
by  emphasizing  the  anti-representationalist,  non-foundationalist,  and  even  post  modern
tendencies of his thought.”71 In order to avoid convoluting the re-construction of Adorno’s
critique  of  Husserl,  we  will  follow  Peter  Gordon’s  approach72 and  pass  judgement  on
whether  Adorno’s  charges  against  Husserl  are  justified  or  not.  This  will  allow  us  to
faithfully re-construct Adorno’s argument without trying to ‘make it ring more true’.
Adorno’s criticism of Husserl is not only a philosophical critique that expresses “the
idea that logical absolutism is committed to a concept of truth that it cannot deliver”73, but
also possesses a meta-philosophical character, providing the idea that “Husserl could never
have  regarded  logical  absolutism  as  the  necessary  consequence  of  the  refutation  of
psychologism had  he  not  already  been  committed  to  certain  presuppositions  about  the
character of objectivity”.74 Our reconstruction of Adorno’s critique of Husserl will aim to
establish the unity between its philosophical and meta-philosophical features.
71 Miller, “Phenomenology’s Negative Dialectic”, Philosophical Forum Quarterly, 100-101.
72 Peter E. Gordon, Adorno and Existence (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016)
73 O’Connor, Adorno’s Negative Dialectic, 134.
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Let’s  first  consider  Husserl’s  ‘meta-philosophical’  presuppositions  regarding
objectivity. While Husserl’s inaugural gesture was to rescue the concept of the given from
the  reductionist  conception  of  psychologistic  subjectivity  held  by  positivism,  Adorno
deemed that his project would be destined to failure once it required him to employ his own
concepts in a positivistic manner:
...the tendencies by which [Husserl] became an enemy of the psychologistic positivism of his 
time  […]  have  their  roots  in  positivism  itself.  […]  That  is  to  say,  if  he  criticized  the  
psychological  approach  to  mathematics  and  hence  to  logic,  his  motive  was  not  one  of  
metaphysical  speculation,  but  he  found  that  when  analyzing  scientifically  the  nature  of  
mathematical truth such as this truth is given in positive mathematical science, it could not  
possibly be reduced to the psychological acts of thinking related to those truths.75
The  positivistic  propensity  to  identify  givenness  with  mind-independent  objectivity  is
present  in  Husserl’s  attempt  to  divorce  givenness  from  psychologism:  because
mathematical truth exists independently of the contingencies of the empirical individual’s
psychology and the thinking which stems from it, its logical validity is not a  product of
subjectivity.  The  objectivity  of  truth  is  thus  ‘given’ in  the  same  way  as  the  positivist
conception of mind-independent objectivity: “Husserl thought he was insisting upon facts
themselves,  namely,  the  ‘fact’ of  mathematical  truths  as  ideal  unities  unrelated  to  any
factual  existence.  These truths  themselves have to  be regarded as  facts  in the sense of
something  given  which  has  to  be  accepted  as  it  is  and  can  not  be  modified  by  any
explanatory hypotheses”.76
 The attempt at  making a necessary connection between empirical  objects  and  a
priori concepts ends up in the subordination of the former to the latter through the concept
of  “sense” (Sinn), or the immanent  meaning of the object that persists regardless of the
empirical aspects of its contingent spatio-temporal situation77. The concept of sense is what
Husserl uses to move from the critique of the psychologistic conception of logic to that of
epistemology: “Husserl argues by inquiring about the sense of logical propositions. Such a
75 Adorno, “Husserl and the Problem of Idealism”, The Journal of Philosophy, 8-9.
76 Ibid, 9.
77 Husserl, Ideas I, 309.
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‘sense’ then becomes the canon for the theory of authentic consciousness”.78 The inquiry
into  the  sense  of  logical  propositions  demonstrates  their  objectivity  in  relation to  the
subject, namely by establishing the subject’s dependence on them if it is to be certain about
anything in experience: “We begin with the usual equivocal verbal reference to the content
of consciousness. As content we take the ‘sense’, of which we say that in or through it
consciousness relates to something objective as ‘its’ something objective”.79  This peculiar
form of subject-object relation is called intentionality.
The concept of intentionality is employed to bundle-up the object to the conceptual
mediation that the subject requires to make the latter “its own”, all while preserving the
object’s immediacy in experience – or, that which should result from its independence to
subject. Intentionality is meant to unify the “sense-bestowing activity of consciousness”80
(noesis) and the “objective correlate”81  that it is directed at (noema). Sense cannot be easily
equivocated with  noema, as the former exists as “intentional content” that is meant to be
fulfilled through the noetic  act,  while  the latter  exists  as the “abstract  entity” which is
immanent to noesis.82 In other words, Adorno understands the noema as a type of non-real
placeholder for what we used to take for granted as the actually-existing, empirical object
of  the  natural  attitude:  “The  noema  is  a  hybrid  between  subjective  immanence  and
transcendent objectivity”.83 The concept of intentionality is thus meant to guarantee two
things: on one hand, the object of experience is now mediated by subjectivity in the sense
that its immanent meaning (Sinn) is the result of a correlation between noesis and noema.
On the other hand, the intentional object now gains a renewed sense of objectivity, in the
sense that its transcendent character – its givenness – no longer originates from a contingent
source (sensuous materiality) and is instead derived from the cognitive acts that necessarily
pre-figure our sensory experience of objects.
78 Adorno, Against Epistemology, 109.
79 Husserl, Ideas I, 309.
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Now that we’ve established the concepts that Adorno will criticize, we can turn to
his philosophical misgivings with Husserl’s logical absolutism. These are centered around
the idea that “logical absolutism is committed to a concept of truth that it cannot deliver”84,
and this is because “it operates outside of the conditions of intelligibility:  mediation”.85
When we state  that  the  concept  of  intentionality  allows  for  the  object  to  be  mediated
subjectively in experience, the concept of “mediation” means different things for Husserl
and Adorno. While the term implies a certain form of conceptual re-adjustment for Adorno,
this cannot be the case for Husserl because he has yet to secure this very possibility:
…the only way in which the ‘real’, the psychological reality of man, and the ideal, the absolute 
validity of logical and mathematical truths, are interconnected, is the very same principle which 
was rejected as a means of justification in the first volume of the  Logische Untersuchungen,  
namely, the process of thinking. For the ideal truths are truths of thinking and thinking only. […]
On the other hand, thinking means human thinking and we know of no thought which would not
presuppose actual psychical acts of thinking of actual living individuals.86
In  other  words,  while  Adorno understands  mediation  as  a  process  of  thinking,  Husserl
instead understands it as an intrinsic property of the intentional object. This is problematic
for Adorno,  as conceptual givens such as ‘intrinsic’ properties can only be determined by
means of systematic thought. The idea that concepts can be ‘given’ is a necessary condition
of transcendental subjectivity: concepts are ‘given’ in the sense that they seem to precede
the process of spiritual experience itself,  structuring the latter as a whole.  Yet while ‘given’
concepts are effectively ‘baked-into’ the transcendental subject in the form of categories,
what  is  given  empirically  possesses  a  non-conceptual  ‘remainder’  that  cannot  be
immediately integrated into a pre-established conceptual apparatus. The empirically-given
object must first be experienced in its actuality – or non-identity to subjectivity – in order
for the subject to then ‘produce’ the remainder through the experience of error – which now
serves as a clue to the inadequate conceptualization that has just occurred. Only once the
object is experienced can it prompt one to determine whether the concepts they take for
84 O’Connor, Adorno’s Negative Dialectic, 134.
85 Ibid.
86 Adorno, “Husserl and the Problem of Idealism”, The Journal of Philosophy, 10-11.
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granted are actually allowing them to develop an adequate experience of the object in the
first place. In this sense, Adorno’s charge against Husserl is of Hegelian origin: “Objectivity
and ideality  in  logic  – its  reified  being in-itself  –  which  is  supposed to  be  proved by
philosophical  critique,  is  already  presupposed  by  a  method  which  attributes  to  logic  a
rationality and clarity independent of the state of its development [within subjectivity] and
is thus satisfied with substantiating it descriptively”.87
For Husserl,  the  relation  of  necessity  between the  noetic  act  and its  intentional
object must exist prior to the experience of error that prompts the subject to re-adjust its
concepts: just like mind-independent reality, the object’s sense must be  received.  This is
misguided  in  Adorno’s  view,  as  objects  can  only  be  ‘received’ by  sensation  in  their
empirically-given form. In other words, the object’s corresponding concept is not received
inasmuch as it  is  developed through the subject’s  encounter  with the object  itself.  The
possibility of intuitively  receiving  an object’s “sense” before actually mediating the latter
through the conceptual activity of thought is thus contingent upon the immediate manner in
which noema and noesis relate:
Husserl immediately interprets the act [noesis] which is directed to the ‘abstract part moment’ 
of  content  as  the  intuition  of  the  species,  as  long  as  that  moment  is  based  on  something  
hyletic  [immediate  to  sensation].  He  profits  to  a  degree  from  two  mutually  exclusive  
qualifications: First, the immediacy with which something is perceived should guarantee the  
intuitive character of [noesis]; but secondly, so that the sense perceptible does not thus present 
itself as isolated, but rather as intertwined with thought, that immediacy should also turn the  
immediately  intuited  into  something  mental,  ie.  a  concept,  which  shines  immediately  on  
singularity, heedless of the character of the concept as the abstract unity of identical moments.88
In the intentional relation, reality can be unjustly collapsed into ideality via the subsequent
identification of both on the basis of their purported immediacy in experience: the  noetic
act of perception immediately seizes the object’s  noematic core –  which now takes the
place of its  essence –,  the result  of which is the intuition of its  species, the immediate
“sense” that covers over the tension between the object’s  real  and ideal features.  What
87 Adorno, Against Epistemology, 60-61.
88 Ibid, 99-100; my additions.
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remains is the object in its ideality, yet consciousness relates to it as if it were an actually
existing object: ideality now takes the place of materiality in the unfolding of experience.
For Adorno, “The controversy of universals cannot be settled by a decree according
to which the universal, as just the meant ‘itself’ converges with what exists, the given, the
res”.89 The aim of the Husserlian project is thus contradictory, namely due to the ambiguous
nature the latter assigns to givenness: the immediately-given intuition must be transformed
into what is actually a mediated concept without recourse to the systematic thought that
determines such a transformation. In Adornian parlance, it wants to immediately achieve
universality without paying the necessary price of abstraction: “Reification nestles in the
prima characteristica of the given (on which the whole of phenomenology is based) as
something already determined [mediated]. It nestles in the belief that one may attain mental
states-of-affairs without the ornament of thought”.90
Husserl  can  “attain  mental  states  of  affairs  without  the  ornament  of  thought”
because of their ambiguous character:  they are ‘mental’ inasmuch as they are products of
thought, yet they are treated as objective “states of affairs” that can be received prior to the
movement of conceptual adjustment. Speaking of the pre-given truth that is immediately
received during the noetic act (sachverhalte), “Husserl91 says: ‘The Sachverhalt is related to
the more or less ‘giving act’ of becoming aware of it as the sensual object is related to sense
perception. We feel impelled to go even so far as to say, the Sachverhalt, the purely logical
idea  of  truth,  is  related  to  its  intellectual  perception  as  the  sensual  object  to  sense
perception’”.92 Adorno clarifies this further in “Against Epistemology”:
There results a quid pro quo between sensation and perceptions thanks to which immediate  
certainty secured by sense-impressions is bound up with the objecthood assumed in Husserl’s  
conception of intentionality. […] For the sake of the purification of the [factually contingent]  
from activity, perception is reduced to the passivity of absolute immediacy, translated  back,  so  
to  speak,  into  sensation,  though  more  cognitive  performance  is  demanded  of  it  than  of  
89 Adorno, Against Epistemology, 124.
90 Ibid, 31; my addition.
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sensation.93
For Husserl, our perception of intentional objects – the condition of noesis –   functions in a
similar  way to sensation,  despite the fact  that sensation itself  is  dependent  on the very
empirical aspects of the objects which are bracketed by phenomenological reduction:  “The
composition of the object out of the elements of cognition and their unity assumes what is
to be deduced. Terms like stuff and matter […] which denote the given in all philosophy of
immanence, recall, and not by chance, that character of the established or in-itself which is
distilled from transcendent things”.94 In other words, Husserl’s notion that concepts can be
given in a similar way to objects is what leads him to “interpret thinking not as action, but
as looking at things”.95
Adorno  believes  this  to  be  mistaken  because  both  intellectual  perception  and
sensation function in distinct ways: sensation is what receives the immediate, undetermined
data of experience, while intellectual perception is what allows us to mold this data into
particular  objects.  Both  necessarily  interconnect  on  the  basis  of  these  differences:
intellectual perception mediates sensation by anticipating what is to be formed into objects,
and  sensation  mediates  perception  by  providing  the  content  that  is  to  be  formed.  For
example, the encounter with a tree is not merely an encounter with a variety of colors and
materials; instead we encounter this variety as a tree – an already-formed perceptual object.
While  Adorno agrees  with  the  fact  that  sensation  is  always mediated  by perception  in
experience96, it does not mean that the former can merely be subordinated to the latter. On
the contrary, the main point of keeping both separate is that they harbor the possibility of
non-identity: the immediate data that we form into objects can end up falsifying the very
concepts employed by intellectual perception in this formation, consequently allowing for
the possibility of determinate negation. The upshot is that each faculty serves as a necessary
corrective to the other: perception requires sensation in order to ensure that it does not fall
93 Adorno, Against Epistemology, 151-152.
94 Ibid, 139.
95 Adorno, “Husserl and the Problem of Idealism”, The Journal of Philosophy, 6.
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into disillusion, and sensation requires perception in order to shape sense-impressions into
objects:
...no sheer sensation can be detached from perception in the real life of consciousness. The two 
can be distinguished only by dint of a theory which posits sensation as the placeholder for the 
thing-in-itself  […]  Sensation, despite its somatic essence, is completely diluted of full reality 
through the reduction to subjective immanence […] On the other hand, individual perceptions 
are also not the source of justification for cognition […] Perception, as consciousness of each 
object, as rudimentary judgement, is for its part exposed to disillusion and not  incontrovertibly 
there.97
2.6 The Ambiguous Conception of The Given in Phenomenology
The result of the failure to identify immediacy and mediation is Husserl’s ‘renewed’
conception of the given. The concept is stripped of the very power it had over the idealistic
notion of the transcendental: “Husserl’s broadening of the concept of givenness changes it
qualitatively. Givenness loses what it was originally conceived for, a sense which Husserl
maintains: the opaque, what cannot be removed, what must simply be acknowledged, and
which  prescribes  to  thought  its  fixed  boundaries.  Husserl’s  interpretation  of  mediate
givenness suffers from the fact  that  he further credits  it  with what vanishes with those
modifications,  viz  the  immediacy  of  what  is  meant”.98 In  its  inability  to  negate  its
positivistic conception, Husserl’s conception of the given is identified with intentionality
instead  of  becoming a  more  concrete concept.  This  ambiguity  allows  for  the  world of
immediate meaning – what is given conceptually – to be functionally identified with the
material world:
Since  acts  of  thought  as  such  may  be  immediate  facts  of  consciousness  just  as  much  as  
immediate impressions of sense-perception, then what for Husserl is in each case thought in acts
of  thought  –is  mediated  by  them  –,  becomes  for  its  part,  immediacy  […]  Hence  
intentionality  in  the  pregnant  sense,  which  Husserl  gave  the  term,  would  in  the  end  be  
identical  with  givenness.  Since  the  mediated,  what  is  already  thought  through  intention,  
should  simply  be assumed,  the  concept  of  immediate  givenness  becomes total.  Perception  
97 Adorno, Against Epistemology, 156-157.
98 Ibid, 128.
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becomes  knowledge  of  something,  this  knowledge  becomes  the  primary,  irreducible  
factual state of consciousness and the perceived thing-world becomes, so to speak, a radical
first.99
The  concept  of  intentionality  –  now  equated  with  givenness  itself  –  allows  for  the
establishment of an absolute beginning for philosophical  investigation:  as the ‘purified’
object – itself the result of mediation – can now be understood in its objectivity without
recourse  to  mediation,  philosophy  has  a  foundation  from which  all  further  conceptual
mediation can depart.  A foundation such as this one is necessary,  for if objects are not
completely covered by intentionality – in the sense that some of the object’s features are not
made immediately intelligible as noema in the light of noesis –,  they would then possess a
contingent form  of  transcendence,  which  is  consequently  unusable  in  the  founding  of
knowledge’s possibility: “Husserl calls the mediate immediate because he believes in the
datum:  he  wants  to  detach  the  mediate,  that  is,  the  verités  de  raison,  from  the  mere
possibility  of  being  fallacious.  In  turn  he  attributes  to  the  immediate  a  generality  and
necessity which can be obtained only by mediation, by the process of reflection”.100
Husserl’s  commitment  to  foundationalism  results  in  the  grounding  and
establishment of an essential ‘field’ that can then be surveyed and analyzed scientifically.
Seeing as all possible objects of sensation are immediately given, intentionality now gains
this same relation to its own totality, that of sense: “We have not lost anything but rather
have gained the whole of absolute being which, rightly understood, contains within itself,
‘constitutes’  within  itself,  all  worldly  transcendencies”.101 The  totality  of  “sense”  is
available to noesis because of the concept’s symbolic function, which allows the subject to
immediately  refer  to  other  noetic  acts  and  their  respective  ‘senses’.  ‘Senses’ are  not
understood in their  contingency as historically-determined and ever-changing meanings,
but  instead  understood  as  if they  were  material  objects:  “meaning  can  be  shifted  to
something static, viz. the expression, as its specific and even […] thingly, definitely present
quality. Intentionality serves so well as a foundation of the doctrine of essence, however,
99 Adorno, Against Epistemology, 129-130.
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because the symbolized is voided of sheer existence in acts which always pass for pregnant
‘consciousness’, viz. consciousness of something”.102 If ‘sense’ were revealed to be relative
– if the seemingly immutable meanings of individual objects were dissolved through the
experience of disenchantment – it would be impossible to immediately seize them in their
totality insofar as certain senses might no longer serve as fixed references for others. The
world of sense unearthed by Husserl is thus a static inversion of the dynamic world that
living subjects actually engage with. Conversely, its subject assumes the same character: a
transcendental monad that cannot engage with the world reciprocally insofar as it precedes
the very constitution of the world itself.
For Adorno, transcendental subjectivity serves as a placeholder for what is lacking
in  our  ability  to  immediately  pin  a  concept  to  an  object.  After  the  process  of
phenomenological reduction, what is left is no longer an object in the emphatic sense, but
instead a reduced version of the object that has been tailor-made to function within the
transcendental subject’s pre-determined conceptual apparatus: “Thanks to this equivocation
[between  meaning  and  objecthood],  Husserl  succeeds  in  slipping  into  every  individual
[noetic] act a result which is fulfilled not by the fact but, idealistically speaking, by the
synthetic unity of apperception”.103 Yet if this is the case, then Husserl cannot provide the
basis  for  a  critical  conception  of  experience,  as  the  content  of  the  latter  consists  of
immutable givens that are passively received by a subject that cannot  actively experience
anything. The Husserlian subject becomes a reflection of the reified world, and the world
inventoried by this subject becomes a petrified reflection of its condition of possibility: “If
the subject includes ‘everything’  in itself and bestows meaning on everything, then it might
just  as  well  not  be  there  as  an  essential  moment  of  cognition.  […]  Since  the  ego  as
constituting or sense-providing condition espouses and assumes itself before all objectivity,
it  renounces  any  interference  from cognition  and  certainly  praxis.  Uncritically  and  in
contemplative passivity it lays out an inventory of the thing world as that world is presented
to it in reigning order”.104





The Role of Spiritual Experience in a Critical Theory of Society
3.1 Against  Methodological  Thinking:  Spiritual  Experience  and  Interpretation
The aim of reconstructing Adorno’s critiques of positivism and phenomenology is to
establish their point of convergence. Both sacrifice the possibility of an unreduced account of
experience in exchange for one whose contents can be established in their totality, namely
from the methodological basis of a first principle: the subordination of experience to isolated
conceptions  of  facticity  (appearance)  or  transcendence  (essence).  Positivism  and
phenomenology turn away from the richness of experience – the result of its heterogeneity
with what merely ‘is’ and the conceptual apparatus that is tasked with capturing it – for the
certainty  that  is  granted  to  them  by  their  respective  principles.  Certainty  is  ensured  by
‘preparing’ the  object  before  the  latter  is  actually  experienced,  namely  by  analytically
separating the latter’s  empirical  and essential  aspects before their  actual  non-identity can
become apparent  within experience itself.  After one aspect  is  subtracted,   the content  of
experience  can  be  construed  as  given  by  identifying  it  with  what  remains  after  the
subtraction: this is no coincidence, as the ‘other’ form of givenness is effectively antinomical
to the remainder. It is in this sense that positivism can limit experience to what appears, while
phenomenology can bracket the phenomenal appearance of objects in order to establish a
world of sense which necessarily structures experience before it  actually occurs.  As first
principles are posited as being prior to experience in the sense that they are a condition of the
latter’s possibility, Adorno understands first principles as residing outside of the historical
bounds  of  experience:  they  remain  supra-temporal,  unlike  the  transient,  historically-
sedimented objects whose possibility they are meant to secure. While phenomenology makes
explicit  its  aim  to  secure  the  possibility  of  experience  on  a  first  principle,  positivist
methodology  simply  establishes  the  principle  of  equivalence  between  truth  and  mind-
independent  objectivity  before  experience  itself  is  submitted  to  analysis;  in  both  cases,
experience is accounted for from without. The fact that experience can only be accounted for
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from without in order to become intelligible represents an objective lack, pointing to the fact
that experience itself is incoherent within this particular historical situation: if the latter were
internally coherent, it would not have to be explained from a vantage point other than its
own. 
The commitment to method allows for positivism and phenomenology to serve as
complementary ways of accounting for – and artificially unifying – the aspects of experience
that are mutilated within administered society. Experience is to be broken down into parts,
inventoried  and  efficiently  re-assembled  into  a  configuration  that  prioritizes  either  its
essential or empirical components – each appropriately formalized. Roger Foster correctly
points out that this represents a significant difference between methodology and the type of
dialectical  thinking  that  we  require  in  order  to  grasp  experience  in  its  spiritual  sense:
“Conceptual cognition becomes pure classification (knowing how to group things under a
concept) when it is pulled out of the context of human life and interests that gives the word
its experiential significance”.105 Once particulars are classified in this way, the whole that
they express takes  on the same quality:  it  is  understood as a given,  no longer ripe with
experiential  possibilities  that  appear  within  its  antagonistic  character.  The  world  of
experience presupposed by methodological thinking is thus “a closed world in the sense that
absolutely everything that is possible within experience is already regarded or experienced
by human beings as something pre-formed by society”.106 Possible experience becomes part
and parcel of what is actual, and what is actual is solely construed as what can be guaranteed
empirically by the logic of exchange society. In order to identify what is experienced with
what  is  systematically  guaranteed  by  society  prior  to  the  unfolding  of  the  former,
methodology arms itself  with its  own “systematic  structure”,  established by  “finding the
conceptual forms which correspond to this pre-organized character, which are already foisted
upon everything that is […] through the phenomenon of the administered world”.107 It is thus
in the practical context of the administered world that methodological thinking unites the
seemingly disparate projects of positivism and phenomenology on the basis of their appeals
105 Roger Foster, Adorno: The Recovery of Experience (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2008), 14.
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to immediacy:  “what is immediately given and the forms, which are equally simply given,
are tailored complementarily to each other”.108
 Adorno affirms that  “The goal of philosophy, pace Wittgenstein,  would be to say
what cannot be said”109, and this is because there exists possible knowledge of society that
cannot  be  formulated  within  the  systematic  methodological  structure  that  is  meant  to
organize its particular elements. This requires us to give ourselves to the particular object
“without reservation”, as that which cannot be said is effectively harbored within the latter. If
we are to “entrust” ourselves to our experiences110, –  if we are to open ourselves to what is
radically  other  –  we must thus be wary of first principles. On the other hand, to entrust
oneself to their experiences means that one must work from within the historically-mediated
context of experience, and to consequently view its contingencies as parts of a cipher instead
of methodological dead-ends. We must thus allow the object to ‘have its say’ in experience,
regardless of how contingent we think it is: “philosophy, persistently and with the claim of
truth,  must  proceed  interpretively  without  ever  possessing  a  sure  key  to  interpretation;
nothing more is given to it than fleeting, disappearing traces within the riddle figures of that
which exists and their astonishing entwinings. The history  of  philosophy  is  nothing  other
than the history of such entwinings. Thus it reaches so few ‘results’”.111
 The form of thought that actualizes this relation of trust is called  “interpretation”
(Deutung). Adorno’s concept of interpretation can already be given substance by what we
have concluded in the reconstruction of his critiques of positivism and phenomenology. In
the  critique  of  positivism  we  have  shown  that  philosophical  interpretation  differs  from
scientific  methodology because  the  latter’s  findings  appear  as  “indestructible  and  static”
while those of the former appear as “signs that need unriddling”.112 In other words, what one
comes  across  when interpreting a  phenomena consists  of  a  set  of  clues  that  beckon the
interpreter  to  think  beyond  the  givenness  of  the  latter  by  effectively  ‘pointing’ to  the
universal  conditions  which  mediate  that  very  givenness.  Yet  in  reconstructing  Adorno’s
108 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 187-190.
109 Adorno, Lectures on Negative Dialectics, 185-186.
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critique of phenomenology, we have also shown that the universals which mediate givenness
are not immediately discernible to thought as a coherent whole. This is because the sense of a
given object cannot be both universally-applicable and immediately intelligible insofar as
universals are always constructed via the mediation of subjective concepts, all of which only
gain their significance during the unfolding of experience itself. As interpretation does not
presuppose the givenness of its object, it also refuses to presuppose its own concepts in order
to totally determine the object.
On one hand, by submitting everything that is given in experience to the universality
of the concept, interpretation is a form of total mediation insofar as it eschews direct appeals
to  immediacy  in  the  reconstruction  of  experience.  On  the  other  hand,  in  its  refusal  to
presuppose the universality of the concept,  interpretation also preserves the possibility of
experience’s non-identity with what is already expected of it – when the object asserts its
alterity against what we would traditionally assign it under. While this resistance is possible
on the basis of the object’s purportedly immediate character, the object only has a place in
experience if we are to understand it as something already mediated: if we don’t, we cannot
distinguish between the productions of spirit and their non-conceptual ‘remainder’, as this
remainder only comes into view if we understand it in the context of what it is not, or that
which it resists. As the remainder only appears in the unfolding of the process of spiritual
experience,  the  particular  and historically-mediated function of  the  immediate  is  rescued
from the realm of transcendence – the a priori – and thrust into experience itself. It is in this
sense that Adorno abides by the Hegelian notion that “the a priori is also the a posteriori”,
insofar as it “inspires both his criticism of a grim empirical reality and his critique of a static
apriorism”.113 Before explaining how interpretation is meant to rescue this remainder we will
have to expand on how it  is fragmented and then suppressed within the “grim empirical
reality” of exchange society. We will then establish how this suppression mimics the process
of conceptual identification that occurs on the basis of a “static apriorism”.
113 Adorno, Hegel: Three Studies, 3.
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3.2 The Object of Interpretation:  Givenness as Mutilated Experience
Experience is mutilated in administered society insofar as it is separated on the basis
of its empirical and intelligible aspects (appearance and essence; reality and reason), which
consist of the isolated ‘fields’ where positivism and phenomenology ground their respective
projects.  These  aspects  are  incommensurable  because  the  immediate,  empirical  side  of
experience  –  the  object  of  the  ‘natural  attitude’–   enters  into  contradiction  with  the
intentions of the social totality that mediates it. For Adorno, these intentions are apparent
within society’s conceptual infrastructure, which derives from the principle of exchange-
value and establishes the ‘logic’ of integration in which all particulars are submitted to the
mechanism of exchange. The mechanism of exchange requires its subjects to submit to the
principle of equivalence – the idea that everything can be reduced to its exchange value –
by selling their labor and consequently fitting into particular role in society. The principle
of equivalence has an individuating function, as it centers the subject’s individuality around
its particular role in the production process. Yet the integration of the subject into a pre-
determined role then requires that individuality to be extinguished: this is because one’s
individuality is the result  of contingencies,  while the logic of the production process is
bound by a nature-like necessity – in reality, a mere denial of contingency.
The psychological aspects found on the empirical side of experience reveals the
failure of society’s logical infrastructure to integrate the particularity of the former into
itself: experience becomes tragic, an exemplification of the submission of the individual to
the demands of the mechanism of exchange. The real conditions of living beings – what
makes  them  ‘individuals’ in  the  first  place  –   exist  as  fractures  within  the  supposed
‘positive’ experience of society,  where the latter is merely experienced ‘as it is’:  “since
society is made up of human subjects and is constituted through their functional connection,
its recognition through living, unreduced subjects is far more commensurable with 'reality
itself' than in the natural sciences which are compelled, by the alien nature of a non-human
object,  to  situate  objectivity  entirely  within  the  categorial  mechanism,  in  abstract
subjectivity”.114 In  other  words,  the  heterogeneity  of  the  individual  thus  serves  as  an
114 Adorno et al., The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, 15.
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objective barrier to the homogeneity that underpins the integration of the latter into the
commodity structure.
These fractures are negative experiences in the trivial sense; categorized by Adorno
as manifestations of suffering, the latter now becomes the ‘immediacy’ from which critical
mediation departs: “there actually is a mental experience—fallible indeed, but immediate—
of the essential and the unessential, an experience which only the scientific need for order
can forcibly talk the subjects out of. Where there is  no such experience, knowledge stays
unmoved  and barren.  Its  measure  is  what  happens  objectively  to  the  subjects,  as  their
suffering”.115 Adorno understands suffering as “the weight  of  objective realities bearing
down on the individual”.116 Yet suffering is not only expressed by living subjects, but also
within the very objects that must also be submitted to the logic of exchange:  “Dialectical
critique seeks to salvage or help to establish what does not obey totality, what opposes it or
what first forms itself as the potential of a not yet existent individuation”.117 The process of
abstraction which underpins the erasure of the object’s particularity is contained within the
latter’s sedimented history, just like the memories of suffering that comprise the life of the
living individual. With this in mind,  there now seems to be an affinity between the logic of
conceptual  identification  that  underpins  the  classificatory  strategies  of  methodological
thinking  and  the  total  integration  of  living  beings  into  the  mechanism  of  exchange.
Conversely, Adorno’s interpretative strategy is meant to establish the actual process through
which individual subjects and objects can be come indistinguishable.
The administered society’s ‘corrective’ to the structural problem of the heterogenous
particular  is  the  subordination  of  individuals  to  the  demands  of  exchange  on  an  ever-
increasing level of abstraction.  Simply put, heterogeneous qualities are purged from the
particular  individual  until  it  can  no longer  provide a  basis  for  the latter’s  particularity.
Methodological thinking provides the intellectual framework in which these abstractions
are  coherently  maintained.  Positivism achieves  this  by  reducing  heterogeneity  to  mere
contingency through the  equation of  experience with what  is  merely given empirically.
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While the moment of empirical givenness is a necessary part of unreduced experience, it
cannot serve its  purpose if experience itself  is confined within it:  once this occurs,  the
objects encountered in this moment cannot assert their heterogeneity to subjective concepts
because  our  conceptual  apparatus  is  already  bound  to  the  limitations  which  give  this
moment its very coherence. The socially-mediated character of experience becomes ‘off-
limits’, resulting in the identification between the natural and the historical: the ‘natural’
traits of the empirical individual (say, bourgeois values such as self-assuredness, prudence,
politeness, and so on) are none other than the socially-mediated behaviors required by the
mechanism of exchange. Once the form and content of experience is rendered contingent
by positivism, the phenomenological method gains its reason for excluding the empirical
moment of givenness in the determination of experience, consequently allowing for the
concept  of  givenness  to  now  be  equated  with  the  pure  rationality  of  transcendental
subjectivity.  
While  it  is  apparent  that  positivism and phenomenology  become unified  in  the
methodological sense by their reliance on immediacy as a ground for experience118, we can
now  establish  their  function  within  the  social  totality:  both  methodologies  block  the
possibility of rendering the immediate experience of suffering into a direct expression of
the antagonistic totality. By doing this, positivism and phenomenology assist in legitimizing
the social production of abstract subjects:
The more individuals are in effect degraded into functions within the social totality as they are 
connected up to the system, the more the person pure and simple, as a principle, is consoled and 
exalted with the attributes of creative power, absolute rule and spirit. […] The living individual 
person, such as he is constrained to act and for which he was even internally molded, is as  
homo oeconomicus incarnate closer to the transcendental subject than the living individual he 
must immediately take himself to be. [...] If the standard structure of society is the exchange  
form,  its  rationality  constitutes  people:  what  they  are  for  themselves,  what  they  think  of  
themselves, is secondary. They are deformed at the outset by the mechanism that was then  
philosophically  transfigured  into  the  transcendental.  What is  supposedly most  obvious,  the  
118 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 187-190.
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empirical subject, would actually have to be considered as something not yet existing; from this 
aspect the transcendental subject is ‘constitutive’.119
Passages  such  as  these  remind  us  of  the  idealist  reversal  of  the  rationalist  account  of
experience,  which departs  from the subtraction of the given contingencies  of empirical
subjects to the establishment of the necessary – or transcendental –  features of subjectivity
which underpin them. Yet in exchange society, individuals are already deformed due to
their  immediate  inclusion  within  the  mechanism  of  exchange;  in  other  words,  it  is
impossible to become an individual because the process of ‘becoming’ will always lead to a
pre-established form of personhood (e.g., conformity to accepted social  norms).  In  this
case,  one’s experience is pejoratively construed as ‘positive’ by Adorno, in the sense that it
is not supposed to fall into contradiction with its end. 
Fortunately for the critical theorist, our experience of the totality is not necessarily
positive. What in practice appear to be rational “laws” do not necessarily conform to the
individuals who are experiencing them:
...social laws are purposive-rational ones which are defined by the process of exchange […], 
whereas the sphere which we characterize as that of psychology in the genuine sense
specifically embraces those dimensions in human beings which are not simply exhausted in such
rationality […] psychology in the emphatic sense is always concerned irrational phenomena, in 
other words, with all those phenomena which arise whenever particular individuals withdraw 
from the demands of rationality imposed upon them by society as a whole.120
It must be stressed here that Adorno is not criticizing the process of rationalization from a
romantic or irrationalist standpoint, but instead from the opposite side: in his view, it is the
very irrationality of the process of rationalization that forces individuals to either withdraw
from its demands or conform to them entirely. “the objective rationality of society, namely
that  of  exchange,  continues  to  distance  itself  through its  dynamics,  from the  model  of
logical reason. Consequently, society – what has been made independent – is, in turn, no
longer intelligible”.121 Society only remains unintelligible if we’ve already decided that the
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process of differentiation between its “objective rationality” and “logical reason” is itself
unintelligible; if the latter can be rendered intelligible, then we can understand society as a
process  of  concretization  that  ends  in  the  objectivity  of  irrationality  instead  of  the
actualization of reason itself.  In other words, if we are to follow Hegel’s statement that
“essence must appear”, the essence of society – what is supposed to be logical reason –
becomes irrational throughout its actual process of concretization. Conversely, the critical
tension between essence and appearance must be preserved if this antagonistic process of
concretization is to be understood properly.
3.3 Interpretation and the Immanent Critique of the Totally Administered Society 
The real discontinuity between the intentions of the administered society and that
which  it  administers  is  what  forces  contemporary  philosophy  to  sacrifice  truth  in  the
reconstruction of a reconciliatory conception of experience. Once the empirical foreground
of administration and the conceptual background of intentions are separated analytically,
experience only becomes coherent if we employ either one of the categories as its sole
principle of intelligibility:
The dualism of the intelligible and the empirical […] is better ascribed to the idea of research 
than that of interpretation – the idea of research, which assumes the reduction of the question to 
given and known elements where nothing would seem necessary except the answer. He who 
interprets  by searching  behind  the phenomenal world  for  a  world-in-itself  which  forms its  
foundation and support,  acts  mistakenly like someone who wants  to  find in  the riddle  the  
reflection  of  a  being  which  lies  behind  it,  a  being  mirrored  in  the  riddle,  in  which  it  is  
contained.122
The riddles  present  in  the  givenness  of  ‘what  is’ only  appear  to  us  within a  particular
historical situation – albeit in a cryptic manner –  as fragments of an antagonistic totality
that must be re-assembled by interpretation. The aim of re-assembling such fragments is not
to provide a direct answer to the riddle, but instead to dissolve the latter insofar as it is
understood as a product of a false totality; in other words, re-assembly helps us “decode the
122 Adorno, “The Actuality of Philosophy”, Telos, 126-127.
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life conditions that make the riddle appear in the first place”.123 Adorno provides a tentative
explanation of this in his inaugural lecture; 
The function of riddle-solving is to light up the riddle like lightning and negate it, not to persist 
behind the riddle and imitate it. Authentic philosophic interpretation does not meet up with a 
fixed  meaning  which  already  lies  behind  the  question,  but  lights  it  up  suddenly  and  
momentarily, and consumes it at the same time. Just as riddle-solving is constituted, in that the 
singular and dispersed elements of the question are brought up into various groupings long  
enough for them to close together in a figure out of which the solution springs forth, while the 
question disappears.124
To achieve this, we must take care to render the historical relation between these fragments
intelligible  without  deferring  the  locus  of  that  very  intelligibility  to  an  atemporal
‘background’, as “there is no hidden meaning which could be redeemable from its one-time
and  first-time  historical  appearance”.125 If  we  do  not,  the  riddle  merely  mirrors  this
background, giving us the impression that a direct answer is all that it takes to illuminate it.
Such  an  answer  is  unsatisfactory  insofar  as  it  deepens  the  riddle-like  character  of  the
original  question:  in  response  to  this,  interpretation  is  meant  to  dissolve  the  riddle  by
illuminating the social conditions that it is symptomatic of –  in this case the necessity of
viewing objects  as merely contingent  and subjects  as  abstractions.  As this  can only be
revealed  through  the  determinate  negation  of  concepts,  we  cannot  merely  dissolve  the
riddle on the basis  of prior  knowledge:  we must  thus  depart  from the basic  aspects of
experience  in  the  foreground  and  then  move  towards  the  dissolution  of  increasingly
mediated concepts that structure what is commonly assumed to be the background. Adorno
thus limits conceptuality to experience, in the sense that conceptualization – as well as the
necessity  of  conceptual  re-adjustment  –  always  departs  from  a  historically-contingent
situation.  For  example,  in  relation  to  orthodox  Marxism’s  simplistic  invocation  of  a
necessary  background to  history  – in  which  universal-historical  law unfolds  –,  Adorno
argues that it  is  the reduction of late  capitalism’s inner dynamism to forces that  reside
123 Foster, Adorno: The Recovery of Experience, 48.
124 Adorno, “The Actuality of Philosophy”, Telos, 127.
125 Ibid, 128.
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outside of its historical contingency that hinders any further understanding of the latter’s
historical  specificity –  which allows us to subsequently distinguish between 19th century
capitalism and the ‘late capitalism’ of Adorno’s era. As our understanding of universal laws
of  history  is  already  mediated  by  this  inner-dynamic,  the  invocation  of  a  determinate
‘background’ does injustice to the matter at hand  – the social totality – by covering over its
role in the mediation of the very narratives that we employ to illuminate it.126
The idea that exchange society fulfills its intentions is founded on the notion that
what we experience in its foreground is a direct translation of the promises implicit in its
background. Yet what we experience is not a direct translation, but instead an indirect one:
we instead experience the lack of coherence between background and foreground, which
then becomes the point of entry for a critique of society. Adorno employs the strategy of
immanent critique in order to productively depart from this incoherence. Immanent critique
consists of the refutation of a claim on the basis of its inability to make good on its own
premises.  As the whole itself is contradictory in the sense that organizational society is
effectively  un-organizable  in  its  very  totality,  it  only  becomes  intelligible  through  its
discontinuities,  or the breaks within the systematic integration of particular elements of
society into the whole:
There is absolutely no question that productive thinking today can take the form only of one that
works  through  breaks  and  fractures,  whereas  any  thinking  which  is  simply  oriented  in  
advance to unity, synthesis and harmony can only serve to conceal something which thinking is 
called upon to penetrate, for it then inevitably contents itself with simply reproducing, or even 
reinforcing, the facade of what is already there in the medium of thought.127
Yet  the  disintegration  of  the  determinate  relation  between  background  and  foreground
cannot have a solely negative result, as this would then allow the fragments found in the
foreground to remain as an arbitrary multiplicity, the results of what Hegel calls “abstract
negation”.  In  order  to  produce  something  positive  –  the  figurative  reconstruction  of
experience –, these fragments must be imaginatively re-assembled: in other words we must
not follow a pre-ordained schematic. 
126 Adorno, Introduction to Dialectics, 142.
127 Ibid, 149.
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3.4 The Constellation and The Figurative Reconstruction of Experience
We have shown that for Adorno,  experience of the given is meant to be decoded via
the imaginative re-assembly of its contradictory elements, which disperse into fragments at
every arbitrary attempt to reconcile them. These fragments are organized into analytical
categories on the basis of the methodological ‘questions’ that they are supposed to answer.
The fragments  must  be reconfigured in  a  new way if  one is  to  negate  the question  in
response to which they were created. The non-identity between the figure produced by the
re-configured  fragments  and  its  corresponding  methodological  ‘question’ allows  us  to
consequently negate the latter and reflect on the actual context in which these questions are
posed:
The task of philosophy is not to search for concealed and manifest intentions of reality, but to 
interpret unintentional reality, in that, by the power of constructing figures, or images, out of the 
isolated elements of reality, it negates questions, the exact articulation of which is the task of 
science, a task to which philosophy always remains bound, because its power of illumination is 
not  able  to  catch  fire  otherwise  than  on  these  solid  questions  […]  Interpretation  of  the  
unintentional through a juxtaposition of the analytically isolated elements and illuminations of 
the real by the power of such interpretation is the program of every authentically materialist  
knowledge.128
If these fragments of experience are erroneously re-constructed as givens within scientific
research, then ‘re-configuration’ is a crucial moment in spiritual experience: in the context
of the newly re-configured object, the universality of exchange society becomes apparent
within the particular via the negation of the latter’s givenness. Once the particularity of the
object negatively reflects the universality of exchange society, it can no longer be given
insofar as its mediated character is now intelligible to the critical subject. The object is
thought  beyond its  givenness,  thus prompting the concept  to  surpass  itself  –   to  better
interpret what we (wrongly) took to be the case: “The philosopher’s task is to make the
effort required to transcend the concept through the concept itself, without yielding to the
delusion that he already has possession of the matter to which the concept refers”.129 Now
128 Adorno, “The Actuality of Philosophy”, Telos, 127.
129 Adorno, Lectures on Negative Dialectics, 188.
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that we have an idea why the re-configuration of experience’s fragments is necessary, we
can sketch how this re-configuration occurs.
The critical subject of experience must engage in the total conceptual mediation of
what is immediately given because conceptualization is the sole means of “moving beyond”
the moment of immediacy in experience. Yet conceptuality must be restrained if we are not
to  identify  it  with  the  conceptual  form  of  givenness  that  underpins  transcendental
subjectivity. Adorno will make use of the Benjaminian concept of constellation in order to
achieve  this.  The  function  of  the  constellation  is  to  preserve  non-conceptuality  within
conceptual  mediation.  We proceed  by reconfiguring  the  isolated  elements  of  the  given
object – what the particular individual experience as fractures –  into a constellation of
concepts.  What  is  meant  to  crystallize within the constellation is  the object  in  its  non-
conceptuality, as the interrelation between concepts in the constellation demonstrates the
lack within the systematic process of “pinning the object down” to its traditionally-assigned
concept. 
The “bodies” in the constellation – the peripheral concepts which gravitate around
the object at its center –  are maintained at a critical distance, or else they will be integrated
into  the  traditionally-assigned  concept  that  reified  thought  uses  to  totally  mediate  the
object.  Yet  to  maintain  such  a  tension  involves  simultaneously  holding  its  elements
together, so that they do not disperse into fragments again. The constellation thus makes
productive  use  of  the  two  opposing  forces  within  the  concept,  which  intersect  during
spiritual  experience:  the  subjective  impulse  to  integrate  the  non-identical  through
conceptual identification and the objective impulse of conceptual differentiation that stems
from the inherent non-identity between concepts – the source of which is located in the
very objects that they are dependent on. The constellation’s ability to constrain conceptual
identification on the basis of conceptual differentiation is predicated on the fact that it is a
multiplicity: its concepts cannot converge into a higher one – the role of which is to totally
determine the object –  without falling into antinomy, which occurs when its concepts are
brought into close proximity. The “solidity” of the concept is preserved in this moment:
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despite their historical contingency, concepts do possess a  “kind of firm core”130, in the
sense that they have necessary qualities that grant them their distinct character in relation to
other  concepts.  Adorno avoids  assuming the  intrinsic  solidity  of  the  core by according
priority to the concept’s periphery, or the constellation of associated concepts which end up
illuminating the core. Concepts intersect when their peripheries meet, as the transience of
the relations that occur on the periphery makes it impossible to solidify their respective
cores to the point of reification. In other words, concepts retain their definitions, but only to
the point that these definitions allow for differentiation between concepts: once a concept’s
definition becomes too determinate, it does not allow for the concepts that surround it to
mediate its core. 
If  the  concept’s  core  cannot  be  rigidly  defined  at  the  outset,  the  only  way  of
determining  it  is  negatively,  through  the  analysis  of  the  gaps  that  occur  within  these
peripheral relations between concepts. What could make the concept more determinate is
presented as a blind-spot between the concepts that surround it: as non-conceptuality is the
mark of inadequate conceptualization, this aspect can only appear within these conceptual
gaps.  This  then  leads  to  is  the  restructuring  of  the  concept’s  ‘life’:  instead  of  being
immediately  defined,  the  concept  only  develops  its  definition  as  the  process  of  inter-
conceptual mediation unfolds. 
…the sense and point of […] philosophical definitions is precisely to generate such magnetic 
fields without arresting the movement of concepts. […] And if it is precisely the task of dialectic
to transform what is given in reified form, to transform the merely existent, into a force field of 
this kind, then we might even describe definition in this higher sense as the instrument par  
excellence of dialectical thinking; and perhaps the reason why dialectical thought is especially 
allergic to the vulgar use of definition is precisely that it violates what philosophy must achieve 
at the end by placing what can only be a result and a process right at the beginning.131
It  is  in  this  sense  that  the  constellation  is  employed  by  Adorno  as  a  corrective  to
methodological  thinking.  Once  method  reifies  a  concept  through  a  pre-established
definition, it can then be used to classify objects; the object could then be identified under a
130 Adorno, Introduction to Dialectics, 199.
131 Ibid, 201.
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conceptual category by filtering-out its features that are non-identical to the concept itself.
The  framework  of  the  constellation  allows  us  to  map  out  this  process  of  improper
conceptual  identification,  as  the  given  object  is  the  result  of  its  sedimented  history.
Expressed in the latter  is  the process of inadequate conceptualization that lead it  to be
construed in abstraction as a given: “The goal is not to produce a more exact classification
of the object, but to retrace the steps of the extinguishing of contextual meaning that makes
the object accessible in the terms of static classification. Hence the sedimented history in
the object is the history of what has happened to the object as a result of this process”.132
This form of self-reflection requires a process in which this inadequacy can reveal itself,
and the constellation provides its framework. Now that we’ve established the basic function
of the constellation, we can delve deeper into its role as a bridge between these conceptual
inadequacies and the social antagonisms that they express.
3.5 The  Constellation  and  Social  Physiognomy:  Philosophical  Antinomies  as  
Expressions of an Antagonistic Society
 Adorno is suspicious of the fact that purely philosophical endeavors seem to justify
the  social  processes  that  philosophers  themselves  have  purposely  ignored,  and  this  is
because  they  construe  the  individual  particular  as  a  merely  “repeatable  property”  of  a
universal which is  presupposed before the particular can actually be experienced133:  the
abstract logic of exchange society. The constellation allows Adorno to thrust the universal
back into the process of spiritual experience, namely by allowing particulars to directly
express  this  universal  in  its  actually-existing  form  instead  of  its  abstract,  conceptual
placeholder. As Roger Foster puts it: “Rather than constituting the experiential item as a
discrete and repeatable exemplar, the subject makes interpretive connections between the
experiential item and all the elements surrounding it in its historical context, “attracting”
those elements toward it by demonstrating how the positioning  of  those  elements
illuminates the intrinsic features of this experiential item […]  the type of universal that
132 Foster, Adorno: The Recovery of Experience, 19.
133 Ibid, 3.
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follows from this interpretive practice is simply the fully developed contextual significance
of the particular in question”.134 As Adorno cannot merely posit the existence of these social
processes as necessary determinants of philosophical thought, he will instead criticize these
“pure” endeavors on the basis that they exceed their original scope: the excess in question
being the philosophical content that is meant to re-contextualize experience within a social
totality  that  renders  its  full  expression  impossible.  This  excess  then  paints  a  more
determinate  picture  of  society  insofar  as  it  departs  from  particular  philosophical
abstractions and slowly rises to the social conditions that render them necessary. In other
words, the “progressive” character of the determinate negation is not found in the fact that
it can  eventually produce a definitive image of the society in place, but rather in that it
constantly re-centers critical questions around their particular objective conditions. This re-
invigorates  the  Hegelian  motivation  intrinsic  to  Adorno’s  conception  of  spiritual
experience, where “every step taken by thought comes up against society, and no step can
pin it down as such, as one thing among others.”135 
Adorno’s critique of phenomenology provides an example of how we can use the
constellation  to  establish  the  insufficiencies  of  a  particular  process  of  conceptual
identification, and then allow these insufficiencies to express the concrete social processes
that govern their necessity. As Husserl aimed to develop a ‘mediated’ conception of the
given –  a concept that traditionally concerns the individual particular alone –, all Adorno
had to do was configure the opposing concepts that interrelate around givenness (such as
sensation and intellectual perception; mediation and immediacy) in order to show how the
identification  between  both  creates  a  chain-reaction  that  eventually  re-configures
fundamental  aspects  of  experience  such  as  subject  and  object  into  abstractions.  While
identifying  perception with  sensation seems like a  way towards  developing a  mediated
conception of givenness –  sensation no longer being the locus of immediacy in experience
now that perception assumes its previous role –, it forces us to make too many concessions
when  it  comes  to  necessary  aspects  of  experience:  Husserl’s  conception  of  givenness
134 Foster, Adorno: The Recovery of Experience, 18.
135 Adorno, Hegel: Three Studies, 20; I have modified the english translation in order to avoid 
confusion.
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requires us to identify ideality and materiality under the guise of intentionality, the latter
being a reconstruction of the type of object that is experienced by a transcendental subject.
Even thought they present a reductionistic account of experience, the transcendental subject
and  intentional  object  are  necessary  in  Husserl’s  case because  their  interconnection
provides  the  answer  to  his  fundamental  epistemological  question:  how  is  experience
possible – what are its  necessary features – if every immediately-experienced empirical
particular is contingent?  It is once we re-configure his answer around the key concepts
which make it possible that we start to notice the antinomies – and the erroneous responses
to them – that unfold throughout. As they appear inside the answer to a certain question, the
unfolding of these errors leads us to re-assessing the  scope of the question that produced
them.  In  other  words,  if  we  require  these  types  of  abstractions  in  order  to  secure  a
foundation  for  experience,  then  maybe  we  are  forcing  a  philosophical  answer  onto  a
question  that  cannot  resolved  philosophically:  “why  is  it  impossible  to  reflexively
reconstruct experience without recourse to abstraction”? The field of possible answers is
not always enlarged, but effectively reconfigured: instead of being restricted to subjectivity,
the locus of this “lack” is now shifts towards the objective, socio-historical conditions that
constitute subjectivity itself.  It is within the context of these socio-historical conditions that
abstractions that we submit to criticism possess a function which exceeds the philosophical
question  that  they  were  meant  to  answer:  the  identification  of  the  individual  with  the
demands of the mechanism of exchange. 
This example shows that when the constellation of concepts is re-configured into a
cipher,  the  latter  dissolves  the  questions  in  response  to  which  these  seemingly  given,
isolated abstractions sprung forth as answers. In this case, Husserl’s mediated conception of
givenness is an answer to a particular question; instead of merely negating the answer as a
false  one,  we  will  instead  prod  around  the  answer  in  order  to  determine  why  it  is  a
necessary  response  to  a  possibly  false  question.  This  is  a  decisive  aspect  of  Adorno’s
philosophy,  as  it  is  what  effectively  allows  him  to  move  from  a  philosophy  of
consciousness to a philosophy of praxis. Roger Foster provides a lucid explanation of what
is going on here: “The ‘dissolution’ of philosophical questions is supposed to reflect the
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attainment of self-awareness about the status of philosophical problems. In both cases, one
discovers  that  the  nature  of  philosophical  problems  is  other  than  one  had  previously
thought. This is not to be thought of in terms of a new piece of knowledge that solves the
problem, it is rather an insight that puts the problem itself in a different light, dissolving it
as a problem requiring a philosophical solution”.136  To re-think the traditional philosophical
questions  that  animate  our  understanding  of  experience,  we  must  thus  reconstruct  its
fragments.   In other words,  once we become aware of what types of questions we are
asking  ourselves,  we  can  better  determine  whether  their  answers  can  illuminate  the
fragmented discontinuities within our experience of the social totality. When a question is
deemed inappropriate and consequently negated, we re-frame a new question around the
configuration  of  concepts  that  displaced the  previous  one.  The subjective  mediation  of
objects  can  then  free  the  latter  of  the  prior  expectations  set  forth  by  methodological
thinking.  It is thus through the constellation that the universal can be negatively reflected
within the particular, and the gap between the particular object and the universal concept
now becomes the locus of this reflection.
As the particular must be rescued by conceptual thinking against the latter’s own
“objective” compulsions,  Adorno needs to mediate between the objectivity of the concept
and the spontaneity of the subject. The constellation can achieve this because it is a form of
presentation (Darstellung), which is crucial to Adorno’ conception of spiritual experience:
It is only the process of presentation which allows thought to go beyond the merely pre-given 
character  that  a concept already brings with it  […] Insofar  as I  offer  a resistance to these  
concepts through the process of presentation, insofar as I employ them in such a way that they 
express precisely that and only that which I want to express with them, there is a sense in which 
I  challenge  the  blind  power  of  what  they  bring  with  them,  and  this  facilitates  that  
communication between the mere opaque objectivity of conceptual meaning and the subjective 
intention in which the life of these concepts actually consists. But the distinctive feature of  
presentation in the medium of language lies in the way that this contribution of subjectivity,  
which transpires wherever presentation lays hold of its concepts in an emphatic sense, is not in 
turn an arbitrary matter, does not simply spring from the mere caprice or particular taste of the 
136 Foster, Adorno: The Recovery of Experience, 46.
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singular individual, but itself contains in turn a moment of objectivity which is first mediated 
through subjectivity over against the rigid and merely pre-given objectivity of the concept.137
The  constellation  is  Adorno’s  privileged  mode  of  presentation  because  it  is  a  tailored
solution to the problem of the subject-object split that we have sketched in the first chapter
and have re-assessed in the second: it is meant to present the object in its non-conceptuality
through  conceptual  mediation  alone  –  that  which  idealism  cannot  accomplish  without
recourse  to  a  systematic  and  teleological  account  of  subject-object  identity.  The
constellation is understood as an imaginative form of re-assembly because the necessity of
mediating  between  subjective  impulse  and  the  independent  object  takes  on  a  different
appearance in respect to the particular subject-object structure in question. As such, truth
must be adequately presented if it is to break the structure of subject-identity that robs it of
its own alterity. 
The  constellation  can  present  the  object  in  this  way  due  to  its  physiognomic
function, or its ability to enrich its object by presenting it as something that it is  not; in
Adorno’s case, the object can only be presented as non-conceptual if we first present the
object as if it were a concept. The presupposition of subject-object identity that predicates
this “as if” is then negated within the process of conceptual mediation. This “as if” is what
links the abstractions of conceptual identification and total integration of individuals into
the mechanism of exchange: as we’ve seen, if individuals can be treated  as if they were
either merely empirical objects or transcendental subjects, it is because their particularity is
erased  within  their  actual  existence.  The  key  feature  of  the  physiognomic  mode  of
presentation is thus found in its capacity to express this relation directly:
...instead  of  accepting  the  given  appearance  of  the  phenomena  without  further  analysis,  
"physiognomies"  interpreted  the  phenomena critically  as  unintentional  expressions  of  truth  
about  a  faulty  social  totality  [...]  Physiognomics  showed  how  the  superstructure  details  
contained in the substructure totality in monadological abbreviation, so that the particular, once 
interpreted, became historical, a dialectical image of the whole.138 
137 Adorno, Introduction to Dialectics, 211-212.
138 Susan Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectics (New York, NY: Free Press, 1979), 176.
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3.6 The Dialectical Character of Experience and the Negative Conception of Truth
Spiritual experience departs from the inconsistencies that arise within subjectivity’s
attempt to ‘capture’ its object, and ends with a practically-oriented, non-reifying critique of
the social totality in which that object is constituted as ‘given’. While the subject cannot
properly criticize society at the beginning of the process, it can do so as experience unfolds:
the subject negates the concepts that cannot properly account for the object in experience –
once  negated,  thought  cannot  present  the  object  to  itself  as  given.  As  the  quality  of
givenness is a product of a reified conceptual apparatus, the negation of the given spurs the
concepts  within  the  apparatus  into  movement,  as  they  must  now  re-adjust  themselves
around an object that is reconstructed on the basis of its socially-mediated character. The
latter  is  less  abstract,  more  determinate  and  most  importantly,  understood  at  its  ‘most
historical’.
It is in this sense that Adorno’s conception of mediation is one in which subject and
object  co-constitute  each  other: “there  is  conceptual  being  solely  in  relation  to  some
determinate  factical  being,  and  likewise  there  is  factical  being  only  as  being  that  is
mediated  by  cognition,  and  cognition  cannot  be  thought  otherwise  than  as  conceptual
cognition. Neither of these two moments can therefore be exchanged in favor of the other;
both must be grasped in their necessary reciprocal relationship”.139 Yet co-constitution is an
activity in the sense that it  cannot be static: it  is a  process of mediation in which each
concept prevents the other from becoming a first principle.  As such, the process of co-
constitution  departs  with  the  encounter  between  abstract  forms  of  subjectivity  and
objectivity,  the  non-identity  between  which  is  the  catalyst  for  the  unfolding  of  their
differentiation.  This is  why critique seems general  and abstract  at  the beginning of the
process – what Hegel would call “abstract negation” –, all while becoming increasingly
determinate as the mediation of its object unfolds. The subjective act of negation gains its
“determinate” character because its conceptual activity is always tied to its object,  now
understood in its non-conceptual sense:
139  Adorno, Introduction to Dialectics, 205-206.
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For dialectic knows that it is bound not to any process of definition but to the matter itself, to 
the life at work in the concept. Insofar as such conceptual determination does not appeal to  
definitions, it can only emerge […] through configuration, through the reciprocal interaction  
into which these concepts are drawn. The way in which these concepts can only be properly  
determined in and through this interaction with one another reveals [not only] the insufficiency 
and  inadequacy  of  each  individual  concept  on  its  own,  but  also  the  essentially  relational  
character of them all.140
When  the  object  is  understood  as  if  it  were  a  concept,  the  latter’s  inability  to  totally
determine the object comes to the fore, namely through its interrelation with the concepts
that hover over its periphery. The ‘relational character’ of concepts is thus predicated on
their non-identity: both amongst each other as a multiplicity and in relation to the particular
object that they are configured around.  The non-identity  between abstract concepts and
isolated particulars leads to the constitution of determinate concepts and the spiritualization
of the particular: the extremes of the isolated, empirical particular and the conceptual given
are not preserved in order for mediation to reach a “middle-ground” between the two, but
are instead disintegrated on the basis of their non-identity. With this, experience can move
from  particular  to  universal  without  reifying  the  former  into  its  given  form  and
presupposing the latter in the form of an abstract, general concept. 
The  motor  of  this  movement  is  determinate  negation,  which  we  have  now
demonstrated through the use and analysis of Adorno’s privileged mode of presentation: the
constellation. Determinate negation is fueled by truth in its traditional form: it consumes
this type of truth by stripping the object of its givenness – the solid foundation on which the
traditional conception of truth rests.  The negation of truth in  its  positivity is  hardly an
irrational byproduct of determinate negation; it is instead the metaphorical culmination of
dialectical reason. For Adorno,  “the dialectical concept of truth is a negative concept of
truth” insofar as there is “there is no tangible, positive or thing-like concept of truth”.141
While the traditional conception of truth must be posited, it is but a mere moment insofar as
“it  is  more  a  source  of  illumination  by  which  determinate  negation  or  insight  into
140 Adorno, Introduction to Dialectics, 208.
141 Ibid, 190.
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determinate untruth may transpire”.142 Truth appears within the relations between concepts
that we have noted above; as these relations can only exist as part of a process, “the concept
of truth is not fulfilled in relation to any one particular moment of cognition [and] that no
particular cognition can redeem its whole truth since each refers back and relates to every
other”.143
Determinate negation animates the relations between concepts, and thus requires a
logical structure to do so: conceptual movement must be restrained if it is not to become
arbitrary,  and  these  restraints  are  understood  as  a  set  of  positive  rules  for  conceptual
identification.  Yet  the  transformation  of  truth  from  something  given  to  mediated  is
predicated on the simultaneous transformation of the logical structure of experience: if truth
is  neither conceptually or empirically-given, then the logical structure that allows us to
develop  the  truth  cannot  have  recourse  to  identity  as  its  foundation.  While  a  logical
structure to conceptual movement is necessary, the very purpose of determinate negation
implies that it can never simply contend with the  givenness of such a structure; as such,
truth –  and its logical foundation – must be understood precisely in the untruth of their own
givenness: 
...dialectic is the attempt […] to break free of the compulsive character of logic – in which  
indeed the compulsive character of society is comparably reflected […] The course of logic  
must be challenged by appeal to its own means, challenged therefore by bringing logic itself – 
concretely in relation to all  of its determinations – to an explicit  consciousness of its own  
insufficiency,  allowing  it  to  disintegrate  through  its  own  power.  And  the  power  which  
accomplishes this disintegration, this negative power of the concept in the Hegelian sense, this 
essentially  critical  power  is  indeed  in  truth  identical  with  the  concept  of  truth  itself.144
Truth culminates in universality, but not in the way that we traditionally assume: truth only
becomes “universal” once it has mediated the inevitable confrontation with its own untruth.
If “to think means to identify”145, Adorno’s negative-dialectical approach is a corrective to a
logical form of thinking that suffers from the necessary compulsion to identify whatever it
142 Adorno, Introduction to Dialectics, 190.
143 Ibid, 198-199.
144 Ibid, 216-217.
145 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 16-18.
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encounters with itself: “The contradiction is the non-identical under the aspect of identity;
the primacy of the principle of contradiction in dialectics measures what is heterogenous in
unitary thinking. By colliding against its own borders, it reaches beyond itself. Dialectics is
the consistent consciousness of non-identity. It is not related in advance to a standpoint.
Thought is driven, out of its unavoidable insufficiency, its guilt for what it thinks, towards
it”.146 Suffering is the untruth that the logical structure of truth must contend with, as the
latter cannot dispense with what it will inevitably produce; as such, the phenomenon of
suffering  persists  within  experience,  regardless  of  the  positivity  of  its  account.  The
“presence” of suffering within the sedimented history of the given object becomes the clue
that  leads  us  out  of  the  tautological  structure  of  experience:  “Where  speculation  goes
beyond what it can legitimately cover – there is freedom to be found. It is grounded in the
human subject’s desire to express itself, a precondition of all truth; in the need to lend a
voice to suffering”.147
In  the  determination  of  its  untruth,  the  truth-content  of  the  given  –  its  role  in
experience – becomes apparent: its necessity for experience is predicated on the necessity
of its transformation  within experience. The compulsive character of necessity no longer
becomes an “objective block”,  but instead an opening for the possibilities latent within
what  we used to  take for  granted;  what  merely “is”  no longer  becomes an obstacle  to
thought  once  its  transient  character  comes  to  the  fore.  While  the  opening-up  of  these
possibilities requires subjective agency, they then become the constitutive aspect of that
very  agency:  experience  spirals  into  the  new,  re-invigorated  by  its  critical  relationship
toward its own conditions of possibility.
             ***
146 Ibid.
147 Adorno, Lectures on Negative Dialectics, 189-190.
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Conclusion
The Critical Potential of Spiritual Experience
Reconstructing Adorno’s conception of spiritual experience allows us to illuminate
the  connection  between  the  latter’s  epistemological  and  sociological  works.  While  we
departed from the insufficiencies that arise when establishing the given as a ground for
experience, we have attempted to show how they are centered around an objective lack: the
impoverishment of experience within the process of disenchantment148 that is intrinsic to
modernity.149 Epistemology cannot escape this problem; as such, its wider purpose is to
square our formal understanding of experience with the actual,  withered experiences of
living  individuals.  This  can  be  done  in  two  ways:  either  by  denying  the  actuality  of
experience  and  re-enchanting  the  world  in  its  place  (phenomenology),  or  by  affirming
disenchantment by equating the possibility of experience with its impoverished iteration
(positivism). In either case, experience is tied to an abstract subject instead of the actual
individual: it is either grounded in a transcendental subject that precedes experience, or the
psychological  categories  of  the  ‘natural’  subject,  which  is  the  result  of  classifying
individual particulars into the formal category of ‘species’. In both cases, the subjectivity of
living individuals is always constituted by something that effectively exceeds them, be it
conceptual or natural categories;  what it  is possible to experience is always established
before  experience  can  actually  unfold.  In  reality  however,  what  exceeds  individuals  is
nothing other than society itself; as such, epistemological accounts of experience obfuscate
the latter’s socially-mediated character.
If  the concept  of  the transcendental  concerns  what  is  prior  to  experience  in  the
constitutive  sense,  then  Adorno’s  conception  of  spiritual  experience  consists  of  its
immanent  critique:  the  task  is  thus  to  “break  through  the  delusion  of  constitutive
148 We employ the term in its Weberian usage, as to signify the phenomenon of the “disenchantment of 
the world”.
149 Foster, Adorno: The Recovery of Experience,  9-10.
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subjectivity by means of the power of the subject”.150 Adorno’s conception of experience
presents a novel challenge to the transcendental notion of constitutive subjectivity,  and
does so in two interrelated ways. The first is that it challenges the core presupposition of
transcendental  thought,  yet  it  does  so  from within  the  latter’s  own framework;  contra
positivism,  the  tradition  of  critical  philosophy is  thus  re-invigorated  against  those  who
would opt to return to a pre-critical way of thinking in its wake. Adorno does not merely
negate the implicit presupposition of transcendental thought, as one would do in abstract
negation. Instead, his dialectical form of critique prompts him to inverse the presupposition
itself; as such, transcendental thought is put on a new footing instead of being relegated to
the dustbin of history. The second way flows directly from the first, and shows that if one is
to move on from a conception of experience to a critique of society, the pre-critical path
undertaken by positivistic and phenomenological methodologies leads to a dead end. In
order to understand the relevance of Adorno’s conception of experience for contemporary
philosophy, we will now expand on how both of these challenges intersect.
Adorno’s conception of spiritual experience is established through a critique of the
principle of subject-object identity that governs transcendental accounts of experience such
as subjective idealism. In subjective idealism, the conditions of possibility of experience are
predicated  on  a  relation  of  identity  between  subjective  concepts  and  the  objects  of
experience. Yet as subject-object identity cannot account for the totality of experience – the
objects of experience being non-identical to subjective concepts due to their containment in
an  antagonistic  social  totality  –,  its  failure  promotes  incomplete  responses  such  as
positivism and phenomenology. Responses such as these are deficient because they try to
ground  the  possibility  of  knowledge  on  either  the  givenness  of  mind-independent
objectivity or the presupposition of a priori concepts – the two sides of the ontological gap.
For Adorno, accounts of experience such as these effectively operate within the framework
of idealism’s failure, which opens up a seemingly insurmountable chasm between facticity
and transcendence.  This then allows both disciplines to subsequently submit the excluded
correlate – a necessary aspect of experience in its own right – to the demands of the other,
150 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, xx.
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now  construed  as  a  first  principle.  As  first  principles  are  necessarily  the  product  of
subjective mediation,  these accounts take something that is  supposed to be mediated in
experience  and  instead  establish  it  as  the  condition  of  possible  experience  –  and
subsequently, mediation. Both of these accounts of experience fall into a framework that
necessarily prioritizes abstract subjectivity over objectivity as the ground for experience,
whether they are aware of it or not. 
Adorno’s  solution  is  to  establish the possibility  of  experience on the basis  of  a
relation  of  subject-object  mediation151,  which  we  now  understand  as  a  form  of  co-
constitution. Co-constitution entails a relation of reciprocity between subject object, yet one
which guarantees that the subject does not gain priority over the object: in other words,
reciprocity requires subject-object non-identity. Subject-object mediation thus consists of
the determinate negation of given objects on behalf of a critical subject, who then re-adjusts
what they took to be intuitive concepts on the basis of the non-conceptuality of the object.
In order for experience to be possible, the object must be accorded priority in experience, in
the sense that the subject must ‘give itself’ to the object if the latter is to serve as a clue to
its inadequate conceptualization. If not, the object is mistaken for what our intuitive-yet
inadequate concepts already assumed it to be, and the subjective framework that holds these
concepts  together  –  transcendental  subjectivity  –  remains  in  a  position  of  priority  in
experience, as a condition of the latter’s possibility. 
Brian O’Connor is right to point out that regardless of its emphasis on the non-
identity between subject and object, Adorno’s negative dialectic consists of a transcendental
account  of  experience152,  insofar  as  he  is  still  concerned with the  latter’s  conditions  of
possibility  in  the  wake  of  idealism’s  failure.   As  such,  the  founding  principle  of  the
transcendental  approach  is  dissolved  and  replaced  with  its  opposite:  what  was  once
understood  as  an  insurmountable  correlation  between  thought  and  being  must  now  be
understood as a lack of coherence between both. While this lack of coherence is objective,
the context in which it gains its objective character cannot be presupposed in the same way
151 O’Connor, Adorno’s Negative Dialectic, 55-57.
152 Ibid, 55-57.
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as  an  object;  instead  society  is  an  actualized  form  of  totality,  which  necessarily
encompasses any given object that appears within it. The inability to precisely determine
the social totality at the outset of experience is what allows the latter to unfold towards
more determinate knowledge of the wider context in which this lack is maintained. Like
idealism, the process of spiritual experience leads to the constitution of knowledge, but
unlike idealism this knowledge is constituted negatively; as the universal that underpins
modern society – the logic of exchange –  is irrational in its concretized form, the Absolute
is  only  discernible  through  its  own  negation  in  spiritual  experience.  For  Adorno,  this
tension is constitutive of the actual relation between reason and reality
 It is here that both challenges intersect. The first challenge rightly criticizes what we
thought  to be the organizing principle  of the transcendental account of experience,  and
replaces it with a type of relation that preserves the interaction between subject and object
without forcing the former to determine the latter. As a result, one does not need to merely
think  of  concepts  as  being  prior  to  objects  in  experience;  on  the  other  hand,   mind-
independent objectivity is no longer understood as something from which subjectivity has
been  subtracted,  as  this  would  then  equip  us  with  an  incomplete  understanding of  the
Absolute. Instead, the Absolute is understood as something that simultaneously informs and
evades the subject, prompting the latter to retain its critical ethos in relation to the objects
that it experiences. This is significant in relation to the second challenge, which consists of
the transition between a purely philosophical account of experience to the praxis of social
critique. While Adorno believes that the critique of society does not require an Absolute
subject like in Hegel, nor a historical subject as in Marx, it must still be criticized from the
standpoint of the actual, living individuals that it submits to its abstract logic; if not, it is
impossible to reveal any inconsistencies between the intentions of society and the “grim
empirical reality” that it submits individuals to in order to fulfill those very intentions. In
other words, without a subject of critique, the object of critique – the empirical reality of
society –  becomes identical with the intentions of society. This particular configuration of
empirical reality is normalized through an equation between the natural and the historical.
“Naturalization”  is  conversely  achieved  by  extinguishing  the  historically-contingent
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qualities of society’s subjects, the content of that informs their very particularity as living
individuals. In Adorno’s view, this form of identification is ideological in the sense that it
serves a wider social function: the submission of the living particular to the abstract logic of
exchange society, now taking the form of ‘natural’ law.
Adorno’s  response  is  to  bring  the  problem of  the  transcendental  back  into  the
confines of experience, namely through the critique of the authority gained by the latter
when it structures experience from without. If the concept of the transcendental concerns
the universal concepts that seem to exceed the concrete existence of the subject,  it must be
understood as a problem in the same way that society is understood as a problem when its
processes  end  up  subordinating  subjects  to  a  logic  that  seems  to  elude  their  very
ratiocinations, consequently transforming them into passive objects. This is subject-object
identity expressed in its actual form: the suffering expressed in the object coincides with the
suffering  experienced  by  the  subject,  as  both  are  rendered  functionally  identical.  As
suffering  can  only  be  experienced  by  living  individuals  and  expressed  within  the
sedimented  history  of  particular  objects,  the  particular  becomes  more  constitutive  of
experience than the universals  that are  assumed to mediate it  transcendentally.  In other
words, society is only constitutive of experience insofar as it fails to totally mediate it;
conversely, the whole can only be grasped in its falsehood. Society no longer becomes a
meaning-fulfilling, positive category, but a complex of breaks and fractures through which
its extinguished possibilities can still be retrieved: “The interpretation of given reality and
its abolition are connected to each other, not, of course, in the sense that reality is negated
in the concept, but that out of the construction of a configuration of reality the demand for
its  real  change always  follows  promptly”.153 If  we must  recover  the  relevance  of  first-
generation Frankfurt School thinkers such as Adorno, it is by taking the problem of the
transcendental – and consequently, the concept and sustained critique of society itself – to
heart.
153 Adorno, “The Actuality of Philosophy”, Telos, 129.
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